As the meeting in Annapolis to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict draws near, the ambivalence about it is palpable.
  
On the one hand, one hears comments as by Israeli President Shimon Peres that this meeting is a "historic opportunity." On the other hand, the very fact that Annapolis is being referred to now as a "meeting" and not a "conference" is the surest sign of the reduced expectations and support surrounding it. The reactions to the meeting are a reflection of the particularly complex factors at work at this time regarding the ongoing conflict.
  
On the plus side, offering hope and incentives for progress, is the reality that the current Palestinian leaders, Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, are about as moderate as one will get on the Palestinian side and, in their struggle with Hamas, they want to demonstrate achievements to the Palestinian people; that the Arab world, in a distressed state over the growing regional power of Iran and its allies, Hezbollah and Hamas, is more open to supporting an Israeli-Palestinian agreement; that Israel's Olmert government recognizes that some movement is imperative, if for no other reason than to prevent a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and because stalemate is a bad option for Israel which could lead to a renewal of terrorism on a mass scale and a surge in Arab and international circles behind the insidious idea of a one-state solution for the conflict.
 
Equally potent are negative factors. Counting on Abbas to deliver at a time when he has shown himself to be weaker than ever, may be an illusion. He can't even bring himself to say he will recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Meanwhile, Israel is being put in the usual awkward position of having to come up with the goods for Abbas without any sense that he can ensure security and stability in the West Bank.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert clearly understands that Israel will have to make significant concessions on sensitive issues for peace and security, but to have to do so prematurely, without a payoff, will bring his government down for no good reason. Taking risks must be commensurate with the potential for reward.
 
As for the Bush Administration, though the pundits focus on its political need for some success in the region as the driving force behind the initiative, more significant is their concern about the increasing strength of the extremists in the region and how to undermine that strength. This is a legitimate concern, but questions have been raised about whether Annapolis may be a vehicle to address that at Israel's expense.

Talk over recent weeks of a comprehensive, final agreement, of timetables, of the need to skip the Road Map, heightened such fears. Anxiety surfaced that Israel was being put in a corner, either to make concessions it was not ready for or to turn them down, creating a rift between the U.S. and Israel.
  
It is my view that the Bush Administration and the President himself have more than earned the trust of the friends of Israel over the last seven years. Time after time when Israel was under international attack, the President stood firm in his understanding and support of Israel and its difficult dilemmas. None of which is to say this was anti-Palestinian. On the contrary, he has always believed that the conflict does not have to be a zero-sum game, that what is good for Israel can also be good for the Palestinians, and vice-versa.
  
That is why, despite the anxiety surrounding Annapolis, I have confidence that the Administration will pursue a course that will take into account the need for progress, but in such a manner as not to jeopardize Israel's vital interests nor to present Israel's stance in a negative light.  This means offering hope to the Palestinians and the Arab world that the meeting will be a catalyst for serious negotiations about the core issues of the conflict during the course of the next year.

It also means reassuring Israel, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did in her address to the United Jewish Communities in Nashville, that the outcome of Annapolis will make clear that any concessions to the Palestinians in the future will be dependent on serious and consistent implementation of the first stage of the Road Map -- the reform of Palestinian institutions and the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure.
 
Would such an outcome serve the purpose of strengthening the moderates in the region against the radicals? I'm not sure. But at least it ought to avert some of the more dire predictions--a collapse with a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation; a rift between the U.S. and Israel; an abandonment of hope for cooperation between Israel and the moderate Arabs.
  
If Abbas surprises us over the coming months and shows the kind of resolve and leadership that's been missing until now, who knows. We might look back at Annapolis as a milestone after all.

_____

Abraham H. Foxman is National Director of the Anti-Defamation League and author of The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control.

The Anti-Defamation League, founded in 1913, is the world's leading organization fighting anti-Semitism through programs and services that counteract hatred, prejudice and bigotry.