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"Patriot" Profile #4:
A Fledgling Militia: The Blue Ridge Hunt Club Versus the BATF
Copyright 1996 by Mark Pitcavage
Last Modified June 17, 1996
Introduction:Close to the heart of the militia
movement is a strongly-rooted fear that the federal government
intends to confiscate the weapons belonging to American citizens.
That fear and loathing is most often directed at the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. But when militia and BATF clash,
it's not always clear exactly who is causing what...
The Blue Ridge Hunt Club Versus the BATF
They were coming to take away his guns. This
James Roy Mullins believed with all his heart. The signs were all
there, to anyone clear-headed enough to look for them. Despite
the Second Amendment with its apparently clear mandate, gun
ownership had already been entangled in a confusing and confining
welter of federal regulations that surrounded the buying and
selling of firearms. Laws on the books for years already
prohibited the possession of certain types of guns. Now new laws
sought to limit the asserted right to bear arms, laws that would
prohibit "assault weapons"--though what defined a
weapon as an "assault weapon" was an incoherent mass of
attributes--and would impose a waiting period on weapons
purchases, as if a mugger or burglar would be so kind as to come
back next week, after you had armed yourself. The federal agency
that lurked behind all these liberty-stealing laws was the
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which waited
like a spider at the center of the web of gun laws, waiting for
some unsuspecting gun owner or gun dealer to touch a tripwire by
breaking a regulation. Then it would pounce.
But recently the ATF had not even been waiting for victims to
enter the web. In 1992 it had tried to coerce a small,
privacy-loving man named Randy Weaver into becoming an informer
on some suspected gun runners, using as a club the threat of
prosecution for a sawed-off shotgun that they had convinced
Weaver to make for them. When Weaver refused, they set into
action a chain of events that combined with incompetence to
result in the death of a federal marshal and of Weaver's wife and
son. Then, in 1993, cowboy-like ATF agents in Texas launched a
disastrous raid on a compound belonging to a religious cult
called the Branch Davidians which turned into a deadly firefight.
A long siege followed, which ended in mass suicide as authorities
used tanks and gas to force the cultists out, and the desperate
Davidians set fire to the building. The Davidians had not been
bothering anybody; they had just been gun owners. Who would be
next? How long before the tendrils of the ATF might reach out for
a small-town Virginia gun dealer like James Mullins?
Mullins worried about such things in the fall of 1993, and
gave voice to his fears, trying to shake the complacency of those
around him. Certainly Pulaski, Virginia, a town deep in the woods
whose inhabitants worked for a nearby automobile manufacturing
plant, was a place where people tended to be sympathetic to the
rights of firearms owners. They hunted, they shot targets, and
they tended to be suspicious of too much government. But Mullins
took it a step further. At the Star Barber Shop, at Christian
Coalition meetings, while distributing fliers and brochures, or
in letters to the editor of the local newspaper, the 40 year old
factory worker was determined to wake up the people to the
dangers that faced them. Some people listened approvingly; others
ignored him. His efforts might have backfired, though; even in
conservative Pulaski, many residents came to view him as an
extremist. "I don't think Mullins [speaks] for any majority
of citizens in this town," said Pulaski resident and NRA
member Nick Glenn. "I don't think any of us would agree with
him." Few people were willing to go so far as to say the ATF
was unconstitutional; few people seemed eager to go as far as
Mullins did.
Elsewhere across the country, similarly disaffected patriots
were forming paramilitary groups they called militias. In
Montana, Michigan, Texas, Florida and elsewhere, people were
organizing to protest events such as Ruby Ridge and Waco, and to
protect their clearly endangered right to bear arms. Mullins,
unaware of these efforts, began to work on his own. He put his
considerable knowledge of firearms to use, and began to make a
silencer and to convert weapons to fully automatic machine guns.
Later, he would recall that "I felt it was time to use these
skills. You can't fight a war without the weapons of war."
Nor could you fight a war without an army, or at least
comrades in arms. If the general public would not listen to him,
perhaps a few friends would. Not even having a term for what it
was, Mullins set about creating a militia. Isolated from the main
currents of the patriot movement, he was nevertheless a kindred
spirit, and he knew what was needed: a small group of dedicated
people willing to fight for their rights.
One of the first people Mullins approached was an old friend
of more than fifteen years, Raeford Nelson Thompson. "This
[Waco] is not an isolated incident. This is happening all over,
right now as I speak," Mullins told Thompson. "And you
got a grass-roots-level movement right underground."
Thompson, a 57-year old retired diesel mechanic on disability,
listened sympathetically to Mullins' description of the dangers
posed by the federal government and to his plans for forming a
group to oppose it. Thompson was an NRA member who described
himself as "very conservative." In fact, he not only
belonged to the NRA but also to the more militant Gun Owners of
America, headed by Larry Pratt, a man with ties to the militia
movement. Mullins had the notion of forming some sort of club,
more than a gun club, a political group. A mutual interest in
firearms would be the glue to hold the club together, while
Mullins and Thompson could test members for admission into a core
group of activists.
Through early 1994, Mullins and Thompson set about attracting
people who might be interested in joining such a group. Obvious
potential members would be other area gun dealers, who presumably
would have a similar interest in protecting gun rights. Paul
David Peterson, of Blacksburg, Virginia, was one such person. A
gun dealer and small engine repairman, Peterson could help them
acquire or manufacture firearms. Dennis Frith, 42, who had access
to a useful copy machine, was another person Mullins approached.
A far more colorful sympathizer was William Stump II, a machinist
and ex-Marine who also lived in Pulaski. The 34-year old man,
thin and balding, considered himself a
"constitutionalist," who believed in a literal and very
strict reading of that document. According to Stump, his interest
in politics began when he was in the Marine Corps and an avid
reader of the magazine "Guns and Ammo," which alerted
him to gun control issues as well as the ideas of the founding
fathers. Stump began reading the Federalist Papers and other
early political writings and came away convinced that the federal
government had greatly usurped its authority. Federal courts had
no right to exist in the states. The ATF, the FBI, and other
federal agencies were all illegal entities, possessing no legal
power in the states. Needless to say, gun control was patently
illegal in Stump's view; he was fond of repeating the old joke
that the only type of gun control he believed in was good
marksmanship. Stump regularly attended town meetings to urge his
views; he even criticized Senate candidate Oliver North for not
taking a firm enough stand against gun control. Thompson met
Stump at a Christian Coalition meeting and introduced him to
Mullins.
By the spring of 1994, there were enough interested people--12
to 15--to form a club. At the first meeting, Thompson urged
people to choose a name for the club and to elect officers. The
group selected the name Blue Ridge Hunt Club, and elected Mullins
as president, Thompson as vice-president and "primary
firearms instructor" (the club wanted him to teach sniper
tactics), and Stump as political instructor. At the meeting,
members got a chance to share their views about gun control and
the federal government and to discover that they had common fears
and common concerns. Paul Peterson was one to speak up. "In
the history of, say, revolutionary ideas...," explained
Peterson to the others at the meeting, "the ones that get
caught are the idiots who have one big national committee and
everybody's tied in. But the ones who survive are the ones who
have small groups, people like us scattered all over the
place...And I think, later on, once we get the organization set
up, we're going to have to be doing some training, some studying,
maybe study some videos and become familiar with equipment that
the average man doesn't own and isn't allowed to, but if things
get bad we may lay our hands on it." In a newsletter Mullins
circulated to Club members, the president suggested that the
club's purpose was "to do things that will incite the public
into an uprising against the local, state and federal
authorities...Human targets will be engaged when it is beneficial
to the cause to eliminate particular individuals who oppose
us."
As Thompson later explained, members were thinking there had
already been attacks on citizens and violations of constitutional
rights. Breaking unconstitutional laws did not seem to be immoral
or unethical; the Hunt Club members saw themselves as working to
restore rights. But they were aware, even at this first meeting,
that they were talking about illegal activities, and were
appropriately cautious, to the point of discussing purchasing a
"bugsweeper" to find government listening devices. They
decided to let the club appear as an ordinary gun club.
The second meeting, in May 1994, took place at a remote area
so members could practice firing their weapons. Mullins brought
some of his illegal handiwork: two .22-caliber rifles he had
fitted with home-made silencers made out of galvanized pipe. They
were illegal because silencers must be registered with the
federal government and a fee paid. The club members inspected the
rifles. Although .22's were light weapons, Mullins liked them
because ammunition was so readily available. "It's one of
the most versatile weapons ever made," he said. Even many
professional assassins used them, he added. He had already shown
them to Thompson the previous fall. The retiree had fired them;
they really did work. Stump and Dennis Frith both tried them out.
Hunt Club members did more than fire weapons; they went about
acquiring them. Here gun dealer Paul Peterson was critically
important, because Peterson was a federally licensed firearms
dealer who could potentially provide untraceable weapons to Hunt
Club members. And Peterson was more than willing to cut corners
and bend or even break rules. He backdated federal paperwork for
one gun buyer, and agreed to sell guns to other members without
filling out the required paperwork. Nelson Thompson took him up
on the offer; so did Mullins. Peterson, in his opposition to gun
laws, even went so far as to knowingly sell a weapon to a felon
introduced to him by Thompson. Peterson also decided that he
would at some point "lose" all the federal paperwork
that contained information about the people to whom he had sold
guns at Peterson Sporting Goods. "When I give my license up,
if I do," he said, "I've already talked it over with
some other friends of mine. I'm going to go out of town for the
weekend, and I'm going to come back and my house will be broke
into."
And sometimes, Hunt Club members talked about using their
weapons against human targets. Should the federal government ever
decide to begin confiscating weapons, they decided, they would
break into the Pulaski National Guard Armory to seize the
military weapons there. They'd create a diversion across town,
while others would break in and steal M-16s, rockets, and other
weapons. They'd also break into the police department. As for
police, Mullins figured that many police officers would want to
join the Hunt Club, once it was organized; as for the others,
Mullins speculated that "perhaps a bullet from a
high-powered rifle through their windshield while they are on
patrol might make them change their mind."
The Hunt Club never got a chance to change anybody's mind.
Instead, it was the authorities who took action. In late July
1994, in a scene taken from the nightmares of the members of the
Hunt Club, the ATF struck suddenly, in conjunction with the
Virginia State Police and the Pulaski Police Department,
arresting James Mullins and Paul Peterson, charging the pair with
various weapons violations. Pulaski, ordinarily a quiet town, was
stunned. Some people denounced Mullins as an extremist; a few
tentatively raised their voices in support for him. "I never
did see no guns," said one neighbor. "He seemed like a
real nice person." But when authorities revealed the
contents of a computer disk found in Mullins' home, in which he
outlined plans to raid National Guard armories, many were
shocked.
Members of the Hunt Club, all fearing they might be the next
to be picked up, kept their heads low. The one exception, to no
one's particular surprise, was the firebrand William Stump, who
spoke out against the arrest of Mullins and Peterson to anyone
who cared to listen. "This is just an effort by the ATF to
discredit a movement that has become a little too
effective," he cried. In early August he held a rally to
demonstrate support for the two Hunt Club members; about 30
people attended. Stump had nothing but contempt for the
weakhearted members of the club. "Nobody else, none of his
other friends, would do it," Stump said of the rally.
"Everybody wants to run away when something like this
happens." But just a few days later, the ATF arrested Stump
as well. Later still, they arrested Hunt Club member Dennis
Frith, and a gun dealer who didn't belong to the club, Paul L.
Greene. Altogether five people were charged with 36 violations of
federal firearms law.
Once arrested, Stump was defiant and Peterson despondent. But
Mullins was furious. Arrested not for his political views, but on
strict firearms charges of possessing and selling unregistered
silencers and a short-barreled rifle, and of helping in the
unlawful purchase of a firearm, he sat and stewed in the Roanoke
City Jail. His fury was directed not at the ATF, but at the
person he became increasingly convinced had acted as an informant
to the feds. The betrayal was all the worse because it seemed to
have come from someone Mullins trusted implicitly: Raeford Nelson
Thompson.
Mullins' suspicions were correct. All along, Thompson had been
working as a government informant. Disturbed by Mullins'
increasingly radical diatribes, as well as by the knowledge that
Mullins' was working on illegal silencers and weapons, Thompson
approached a friend in law enforcement, who connected him with
the ATF. "Any time a man looks you dead in the eye and not
even batting an eye says he plans to kill people, I take him dead
serious," Thompson explained. "I'm glad we got this
stopped before it got off the ground. Some of these guys were
trained by the U.S. Military and did know how to do things what I
consider terrorist tactics."
Thompson became an informant for the ATF; a rare thing to
begin with, since most ATF informants are people with the threat
of charges held against them. Thompson wore a wire to Hunt Club
meetings, got money from the ATF to buy weapons illegally from
Mullins and Peterson, took a convicted felon to Peterson to
purchase weapons from the gun-dealer, and in other ways gathered
information on the group and its activities. The ATF accumulated
many hours of recorded conversations thanks to Thompson.
In a rage, Mullins wrote to a friend in North Carolina to whom
he had sent an illegal machine gun, suggesting that he would have
to borrow that "Christmas gift" in order to take care
of "unfinished business." Alarmed, the North
Carolinian, who had in any case destroyed the machine gun, turned
the note over to the authorities, and it served only to cause
Mullins to be held without bond.
After the Christmas gift episode, though, Mullins seemed to
deflate a little; perhaps his attorney finally convinced him of
the seriousness of the charges against him, perhaps it was simply
spending months in jail that calmed him down. But by February
1995, Mullins was willing to plead guilty to seven of the sixteen
counts against him. "I knew the consequences. I went ahead
and took my chances," he admitted. "So I'll take the
punishment, even though I disagree with the law." By the end
of February, Mullins and his lawyer had arranged a plea bargain
which recommended a five year sentence in return for pleading
guilty to seven counts, dealing with the unregistered silencers,
a pistol Mullins bought from Peterson for a third party as a
"straw purchase,"conspiracy to commit firearm
violations, and making and possessing a machine gun.
Also pleading guilty was Paul Peterson, who realized that he
had somehow inserted himself into a very serious mess indeed, and
began cooperating with authorities almost as soon as he was
arrested. Peterson pleaded guilty to conspiracy, to selling guns
in violation of state law, to aiding and abetting in making a
false statement by falsifying gun purchase records, and to
knowingly selling a shotgun to a convicted felon. Because he so
fully cooperated, even testifying at the other's trials, when he
was sentenced, considerably later, he received only three years'
probation (four months under house arrest) and community service
as a punishment.
But from the very beginning, it was apparent that William
Stump was not someone who would give in so easily. Stump, who did
not believe that either the ATF or federal courts in the states
were constitutional, planned to argue that the whole federal
legal system was bogus. "When we win, all U.S. courts will
have to go out of the states, all Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents will have to go out of the states, all Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms agents will have to go out of the
states." Stump sought not a federal grand jury but a state
grand jury to hear his arguments; moreover, he decided he would
represent himself.
At the same time, Club members debated as to what exactly the
Blue Ridge Hunt Club had been. Between August 1994, when they
were arrested, and the spring of 1995, when the legal proceedings
began in earnest, the militia movement had come to the public's
attention. Reports by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the
Anti-Defamation League described the movement as violent,
extremist, and racist. William Stump was adamant that the group
was a militia. "If I'd have chosen it, I would have called
it the Blue Ridge Militia," he explained. "The purpose
was to raise a militia. A militia is the only delegated law
enforcement officers to the Congress." Mullins seemed to
agree, suggesting that "it was more or less a fellowship
thing, with military overtones, militia overtones." But on
April 19, 1995, right-wing extremists blew up the Murrah federal
building in Oklahoma City, killing and wounding hundreds of
people and shocking every American who thought that terrorism was
the province of Middle Eastern fanatics. Hunt Club members were
as shocked as everybody else, although they quickly put the
standard spin on the event--that the federal government had
bombed its own building. "I believe that anybody who blows
up a building where they know there are women and children ought
to be prosecuted, whether they are United States officers or
not," William Stump said.
But when media attention focused on the supposed militia ties
of suspects Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, thus thrusting the
whole movement into a spotlight of intense media scrutiny, Stump
soon realized that it was a bad thing to be associated with a
militia. As jury selection for his trial began in late April,
Stump took his six-week old son (two of his four children were
born during his extended legal battles) Jeb Stuart Stump and
displayed him to the courtroom, shouting that ATF agents were
saying that Stump wanted babies killed. Stump also demanded that
President Bill Clinton appear in court, prompting government
lawyers to question his competence to represent himself. Stump
was getting advice, of a sort, from "constitutionalist"
Mike Tecton, who seemed to think that he could sell the movie
rights to Stump's predicament. However, Judge Jackson Kiser ruled
that Stump was competent to represent himself. He also decided to
delay the trial because he feared that an impartial jury would be
difficult to assemble so soon after the Oklahoma City bombing,
which was clearly true. Kiser also delayed the trials of Dennis
Frith and Paul Greene.
With the trial delayed, Stump took to the offensive,
continuing his campaign to be heard before a grand jury not part
of the federal system. In late May, he showed up at the Pulaski
County Circuit Court to try to face a county grand jury; he stood
outside the court building holding a poster asking the grand jury
to call him to testify. Stump argued that Thompson had been
planning terrorist activity and that ATF agent Scott Fairburn
should be investigated for treason. County officials were not
impressed with his arguments. ATF agent Jim Silvey noted that
ironically Kiser had delayed Stump's trial because of the
possibility of adverse publicity, but Stump continued to call
attention to himself. The other people arrested just wanted to
get the ordeal over with. In August, Dennis Frith pleaded guilty
to conspiring to violate firearm laws, possessing an unregistered
silencer, and making false statements on firearm records. Frith,
said his lawyer, "was anything but a militia member--just a
good old country boy." Frith was sentenced to four months of
house arrest, 200 hours of community service, and was fined
$5,000.
Paul Greene, however, would not plead guilty; in his opinion,
he had not done anything wrong. The 23-year old Virginia Tech
student and gun dealer was not a member of the Blue Ridge Hunt
Club, and all he had done was to sell part of a damaged rifle to
Peterson, who gave it to Mullins. Mullins had later changed the
weapon into a machine gun (the one he sent to North Carolina).
Judge Kiser dismissed two of the charges against Greene; the
dealer was found innocent of the remaining four. It was the first
setback for the ATF effort that had begun so promisingly. The
prosecuting attorneys tried to take it in stride, assistant U.S.
attorney Don Wolthuis asserting that he wasn't "all that
disappointed with the verdict. I think we had a fair trial...From
an evidence standpoint, it was a close case."
But the cases of Frith and Greene were peripheral; all
attention focused on the flamboyant William Stump, the only Hunt
Club member with serious charges and evidence against him who had
not pleaded guilty. When jury selection began in September 1995,
Stump did not disappoint those court watchers who had come to
expect brash action from the constitutionalist who represented
himself. Stump declared his trial illegal, telling Judge Kiser,
"Let the record show I'm not here voluntarily."
(Kiser's response: "That's abundantly clear.") The
judge, fearful that the jury pool might be "poisoned,"
made the somewhat unusual decision of bringing in potential
jurors a few at a time, instead of all at once, to which Stump
loudly objected (because he could not hear what all jurors had to
say before having to select among them). Kiser responded that an
appeals court could correct his decision if he erred. "After
I'm already in prison, being beaten, infected, sodomized?"
Stump responded. Stump himself tried to ask jurors about O. J.
Simpson case celebrity Mark Fuhrman and Randy Weaver, despite the
judge's objections. Marshals had to pin Stump down while Kiser
evacuated jurors from the courtroom. But incompetence had already
caused a few minor pollutants to reach the jury pool. When Kiser
asked two jurors if they had seen or read anything about the
case, they responded that they had seen it on a television
newscast just half an hour earlier, in the jury assembly room.
Later, jurors were allowed to overhear reporters question Stump.
Despite these stumbles, a jury was finally assembled. Stump would
have his day in court, although whether it would be a hearing or
a circus was anybody's guess.
When the trial began, the third week of September 1995, Stump
continued his courtroom theatrics, charging that "the very
existence of this court in the Commonwealth of Virginia is in
violation of the Constitution." He filed lawsuits against
Judge Kiser, as well as Don Wolthuis and Scott Fairburn. Kiser
exhibited considerable patience in dealing with the
self-righteous constitutionalist. As his own lawyer, Stump was at
best amateurish (he did have a court-appointed attorney to advise
him, but he did his own questioning), but Stump focused like a
laser beam on the weak point in the prosecution's case: Raeford
Nelson Thompson.
As news first leaked out that Thompson had informed on the
Blue Ridge Hunt Club, many people congratulated him for taking a
stand against words and actions that would have disturbed most
people. And afterwards, with threats made against his life (he
eventually got permission to carry a concealed weapon for his own
protection), he almost seemed a martyr. But the more one looked
at Thompson, the more one had to question exactly how much the
informant had informed on, and how much the informant had
instigated. After all, Thompson was not merely a member of the
Blue Ridge Hunt Club, he was its vice-president. He had helped
find members; he had even introduced Stump to James Mullins.
Under cross-examination, Thompson acknowledged that he had only
met Stump a month before he became an informant--not, as he had
earlier testified, six months before. Stump was able to claim
that Thompson lured him into the Hunt Club after the
vice-president was aware of its illegal activities.
ATF agents testified that they had carefully schooled Thompson
on avoiding entrapping the members of the Hunt Club, but Thompson
had encouraged club members at their second meeting to fire
silenced weapons, the mere handling of which would be breaking
the law. And the ATF itself seemed far too energetic in their
undercover operations. Would Hunt Club members have ever sold a
weapon to a convicted felon had not an informant brought the
felon in and arranged the deal? Should Hunt Club members who had
merely taken a few target shots with a gun equipped with a
homemade silencer have been considered as culpable as the person
who manufactured the silencer?
Stump introduced other doubts as well. One Hunt Club member
suggested that Thompson told the club how to make fertilizer
bombs. Stump himself argued that "it was only when Thompson
began taking an active role," that any talk of raiding
National Guard Armories surfaced. The constitutionalist freely
admitted handling the silencers, and acknowledged that he knew
Mullins was making them illegally. "But it never occurred to
me," he explained, "[that] by holding it, I could be
charged."
Stump turned the closing arguments over to his court-appointed
lawyer, but in his own rough way, he had more than made his
point. How much of the criminality of the Blue Ridge Hunt Club
was due to the free-willed actions of its members, and how much
of it was the result of an over-eager informer and an
over-aggressive ATF? Had the ATF wanted to prosecute these
home-grown militia members so much that it clouded their
judgment? When the jury returned its verdict, on September 22,
1995, it agreed that he had possessed the illegal
silencers--after all, Stump himself admitted it--but found that
he had not conspired with others to break gun laws. One juror
told reporters that he believed Stump had been entrapped, saying
of Thompson, "Their main witness, I just didn't believe
him."
This represented a significant victory for Stump, but the
constitutionalist was not happy at having been found guilty of
the two silencer-related charges, and planned to appeal, even
before he had been sentenced. During the interval between the end
of the trial and the sentencing, Stump decided to sue Bill
Clinton for $50 million in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. Out
of jail, he took time to show up at an urban affairs class at
Virginia Tech to lecture them on the Constitution. In November,
Stump asked Judge Kiser to set aside the guilty verdicts because
of alleged constitutional violations. They were his standard
allegations--that the federal government could not buy land for a
courthouse in Virginia without the state's consent, that the
Second Amendment protected his right to handle a silencer, that
federal courts had no jurisdiction in Virginia. Stump's efforts
were understandable--he still faced a possible 20 years in
prison, although sentencing guidelines made that unlikely--but
his arguments were, to put it lightly, rather weak, and Kiser was
not inclined to be swayed by them. Another judge refused a fee
waiver for Stump's $5 million civil suit against Kiser, but on
his own Stump pursued suits against Kiser, and sixteen other
public officials, ranging from both of Virginia's senators down
to the Pulaski County sheriff.
Finally, in late February, 1996, the time for sentencing
arrived, more than two years after James Mullins conceived of
forming the Blue Ridge Hunt Club that Stump joined. And to the
surprise of many, Judge Kiser announced that he planned to go
easy on the constitutionalist and would give him a sentence even
lighter than the two to three year sentence that sentencing
guidelines suggested. The judge stated that he was
"uncomfortable" with Raeford Nelson Thompson's
aggressive investigation, observing that "Thompson became a
major player in organizing meetings and contacts among the
alleged conspirators."
Prosecutors were given a chance to respond, before Kiser
issued a sentence. And while all through the arrests and trial
they had maintained that the Blue Ridge Hunt Club members were
being prosecuted not for their political extremism but for
explicit weapons violations, the response of attorney Don
Wolthuis seemed to suggest otherwise. Although Stump shouldn't be
punished because of his beliefs, he said, he should receive a
prison sentence so that people in the militia movement would not
feel justified in thinking that the federal courts had no power
over them. "The failure to impose the sentence required by
law," Wolthuis said, "is to publicly pronounce that
Stump is immune from punishment because the court lacks not the
power, but the will." Wolthuis seemed to want to serve a
lesson to the entire militia movement by a harsh sentence on
Stump.
Kiser didn't buy it. He sentenced the militiaman to only two
months in jail and two more months under house arrest,
repudiating the arguments of the government attorneys. "I do
not believe beliefs should be an element for aggravating
punishment," Kiser said. "Nothing I can say will deter
him from what he believes." Not surprisingly, William Stump
himself repudiated even that sentence, announcing that he planned
to appeal, and attempting to serve more lawsuits on people.
"I'm paying for the crushing and burning of those children
at Waco," Stump explained to reporters. "That is why I
brought the charges against the president for the murders
there."
Stump was freed pending his appeal, but the outcome,
successful or unsuccessful, will be an anti-climax. Kiser and the
jury brought the proceedings to a real close when they all gave
notice that they rejected the contentions of the government.
Was the government wrong? Was the militia right? Clearly, the
answer lies with the person in whose mind the Blue Ridge Hunt
Club was born, James Roy Mullins. Mullins had openly and provably
violated federal firearms laws in 1993. Raeford Thompson, with
presumably all the conscientiousness in the world, turned this
information over to the ATF. Certainly at that point the
authorities could have arrested Mullins, charged him with federal
firearms violations, and the matter would have been over. The
Blue Ridge Hunt Club would never have been formed, no other
members would ever have handled silencers. Quite possibly people
like Paul Peterson would not have committed further firearms
violations; indeed, the arrest of Mullins might have been a
lesson to them all.
Instead, the ATF and Thompson launched an
"undercover" investigation, during which the Blue Ridge
Hunt Club was formed, recordings and even airplanes were used,
and Thompson himself proved to be rather too enthusiastic in
encouraging members of the club to commit crimes. The result was
several years of legal activity that resulted in light sentences
or acquittals for every person except Mullins, who presumably
would have been imprisoned even without all the undercover
activity, simply for making the silencers and machine gun. No
"lessons" were taught the militia; indeed, the
activities of the Blue Ridge Hunt Club hardly caused a blip in
any national news, overshadowed by far greater activities such as
Oklahoma City. Mullins in prison said that he would do it all
over again, while certainly Stump was unrepentant.
The federal authorities did more than make a mountain out of a
molehill; they made a militia out of Mullins. If they had stuck
to arresting and prosecuting James Mullins, they would have been
on safer ground all around. Instead, hamhanded efforts simply
gave extremists some ammunition of their own.
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