The current American and British action against Iraq, Operation Desert Fox, is another chapter in the eight year history of Iraqi intransigence towards its Persian Gulf neighbors and the West and its continued campaign to build up its supply of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, led to a 40 day war in 1991 between Iraq and a coalition of 39 nations, led by the United States. The U.S. and allies, including a coalition of Arab nations, flew 120,000 sorties over Iraq, dropped over one million bombs in Iraqi territory and initiated a speedy land attack, which directly led to Iraq’s surrender. In the aftermath of Iraq’s defeat, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose mandate set out the conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition.

Since that time UNSCOM has been responsible for the inspection, survey and assessment of Iraq's capabilities and facilities in the nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile fields. It has also been responsible for the disposal of weapons of mass destruction, facilities and other related items through destruction, removal or rendering harmless. Finally, UNSCOM has been under mandate to carry out long-term monitoring of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under UN resolution 687-- not to reacquire banned military capabilities.

Following the Persian Gulf War the United Nations levied sanctions on Iraq, which have been strictly applied for the past eight years. The sanctions are scheduled to be kept in place until all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated to UNSCOM’s satisfaction. Although certain exceptions for humanitarian necessities have been allowed under the November 1996 United Nations food-for-oil deal, the sanctions have placed the Iraqi population under great duress.

Since the creation of UNSCOM, Saddam Hussein has been reluctant to cooperate. There have been reports in the Western media that during the past eight years, while the Iraqi people have suffered under the sanctions, Saddam Hussein has invested heavily in the construction of several presidential palaces throughout the country. These are suspected of being covers for weapons plants.

In October 1997 Iraq placed new restrictions on UNSCOM officials, impeding their inspections, and banned two American inspectors from participating in UNSCOM activities altogether. In November of that year, tensions worsened when three more American inspectors were restricted from entering the country and an inspection team inside the country, including American officials, was systematically denied entry to inspection sights every day for eleven days. Because a UN mediation team failed to break the deadlock, the United States resumed surveillance flights over Iraq and did not rule out the option of using a military strike in order to assert its full rights to participate in all UNSCOM activities. With Iraq demanding the removal of all American weapons inspectors from the country, the United Nations instead issued the withdrawal of all its inspectors.

In February 1998 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein again failed to cooperate with UNSCOM officials by preventing them from entering certain important inspection sights. While the United States made clear its commitment to work through diplomatic channels to seek resolution to the crisis, it also demanded that neither the integrity nor mandate of UNSCOM should be diminished.

The U.S. stepped up its military presence in the Gulf region and worked to garner global support for a possible military strike on Iraq. However, a core coalition of international support for such action was never achieved. Although England joined President Clinton in endorsing the use of force should diplomacy fail, most other European nations remained far more restrained. Russia and China, Iraq’s traditional allies on the UN Security Council, expressed clear opposition to the use of force and sent representatives to Baghdad to pursue diplomatic channels.

In the Arab world there was a general lack of readiness to coordinate with the United States. The sentiment was that diplomatic channels were the obvious mechanism of preference, but Iraq should be held responsible for the crisis. Kuwait was the only nation to explicitly endorse the use of American force, but no Arab nation--with the exception of Syria--explicitly stated that force should not be used in the case of diplomatic failure.

A military strike was finally avoided after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan traveled to Iraq to conclude an agreement promising efforts to work towards the reduction of sanctions against Iraq and immediately providing for the resumption of regular UNSCOM inspections. In August, however, Saddam Hussein again declared intentions to cut ties with UNSCOM officials, this time because he did not see viable progress towards the reduction of sanctions. But with long-term monitoring systems intact, a larger crisis was again avoided.

November 1998: The Current Crisis

In October 1998, the United Nations Security Council offered to undertake a comprehensive review of UNSCOM’s weapons inspection program in the context of Secretary Annan’s agreement promising work to eliminate sanctions if UNSCOM were allowed to carry out its duties. However, when the Security Council refused to promise that the evaluation would automatically lead to the lifting of sanctions (as Iraq had demanded), Saddam Hussein again cut off all UNSCOM monitoring activity.

At that time the United States and Britain issued statements first indicating that military force against Iraq had again become a viable option. British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that time was "running out" for Iraq and "the next step is action if he [Saddam Hussein] is not prepared to come back into compliance with his word." The US administration again began to work to gather international support for action against Iraq.

On November 5^th, with UNSCOM monitors still being denied access to inspection sites, the UN Security Council condemned the Iraqi behavior as a "flagrant violation" of standing UN resolutions. On November 11^th the United Nations began the withdrawal of its staff—both monitoring inspectors and humanitarian workers--from Baghdad. In total, 155 humanitarian staffers were evacuated to Amman, Jordan and all 103 UN weapons inspectors were airlifted to Bahrain. Only 40 UN staff members remained in Baghdad as the United States began a major military buildup in the Gulf region, including ships, warplanes and troops.

Unlike the February 1998 crisis, eight Arab foreign ministers—including those from Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia— announced that "The Iraqi government is responsible for any consequences that might arise from its refusal to back down from its decision to expel the UN weapons inspectors.'' Neither French, Russian nor Chinese officials visited Iraq in hopes of working through diplomatic channels to diffuse the crisis as they had done previously. But both Russia and China, expressing sympathies towards Iraq, urged the Security Council to promise to ease sanctions.

Despite prodding from Iraq, Secretary General Kofi Annan made no indication that he would mediate this crisis as he had done in February. In fact, he stated that responsibility for the crisis rests with Iraq. He also called on Saddam Hussein to immediately resume cooperation with weapons inspectors, and was supported by the Security Council in doing so.

In Iraq the "spin" was quite different. Clear efforts were made to put the onus for the crisis on the Americans. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz accused President Clinton of "stubbornly and illegally" blocking the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. A front page editorial of the leading Iraqi newspaper, run by Saddam Hussein’s ruling Baath party, condemned the military buildup as American "psychological warfare." It was reported, as a result, that Iraqi civilians fearing an imminent US strike were lining up outside gasoline stations as prices continued to rise.

In Israel, while defense officials firmly indicated that the chances of an Iraqi missile attack were extremely slim, the Israeli army went so far as to reopen gas mask distribution centers for civilians. As it had done in February, the US State Department "recognized…Israel’s inherent right to self defense," and assured Israel that it would provide advance notice of any attack on Iraq. Questions have arisen, however, over just how far in advance such a warning would be issued in this or future crises. The US also promised to supply Israel with Patriot missiles to defend against possible Scud attacks.

With international support, the United States reportedly prepared to launch a full scale cruise missile attack on Iraq on November 14. However, President Clinton called off the assault just minutes before it was initiated, in response to an ambiguous four page fax from Saddam Hussein to Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York suggesting that Iraq was indeed backing down and would permit UN weapons inspectors to return to Baghdad and resume their work. President Clinton’s final decision was made after two additional letters were sent to the UN Security Council by Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Nizar Hamdoon offering unconditional Iraqi cooperation with the weapons inspectors and renouncing Iraq’s August and October refusals to comply with UNSCOM workers.

However, US and British forces were left standing by in the Gulf region, reserving the right to react quickly should UNSCOM again be faced with Iraqi non-compliance.

December 1998 Missile Strikes

On December 15, the United Nations chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Richard Butler, issued his first report on Iraqi compliance since the inspectors' return to Baghdad in November. The report scathingly accused Saddam Hussein of thwarting the inspectors' work. Within 24 hours, as promised, the United States and Britain reacted with what President Clinton called a "strong, sustained series of air strikes." The strikes are expected to continue for several days, with targets reportedly including suspected weapons plants, Iraqi intelligence agencies and the elite force of the Iraqi army, the Republican Guard.

While the American action has met with opposition at home from some politicians who question the timing of the operation, and abroad from France and Russia who question the lack of consultation, the US insists that it had implicit approval for the strikes as a result of past UN Security Council resolutions on the matter.

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