• The NIE confirms that Iran had a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons.  This program, which the NIE says was shut in the fall of 2003, was carried out from the 1980’s by “Iranian military entities working under government direction.”  While the report states (with “moderate-to-high confidence”) that “Iran does not have currently have a nuclear weapon,” the report does not provide details on the accomplishments of the nuclear weapons program in developing a weapon designed to deliver a nuclear bomb.  The NIE is only “moderately confident” that “Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007 . . .” and goes on to state that “… we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.”  In reaction to the NIE,  Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated that Israeli intelligence indicates that in 2003 Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program “for a certain period of time,” but since then it is “apparently continuing its program.”

• The report states that “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.” The NIE confirms that Iran continues to work on developing the most critical element of any nuclear weapon, enrichment of uranium.  Low levels of enriched uranium are used to fuel civilian-use nuclear reactors, while highly enriched uranium can be used to fuel a nuclear bomb.  The report notes “[W]e assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so.  Iran is proceeding with its centrifuge enrichment activities, and has made “significant progress” in installing centrifuges at its facility in Natanz, albeit while encountering some technical challenges.  The NIE judges with “high confidence” that Iran has not yet produced “sufficient amounts of fissile materials” for a nuclear weapon.  The report states however, that it “cannot rule out” that Iran has acquired, or may acquire, such materials – or even a nuclear weapon – from abroad. 

• The report concludes “with high confidence” that “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.”

• Iran has willfully tried to prevent, divert and postpone International Atomic Energy Agencies (IAEA) attempts to inspect Iran’s nuclear program.  Iran has not provided sufficient information on its alleged civilian nuclear fuel program, much less its nuclear weapons program that the NIE says operated from the late 1980’s through 2003.  IAEA oversight is crucial to ensure that nuclear programs are for civilian energy use, and not being adapted for military purposes.   

• Iran is in violation of three UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran based on its non-compliance with its obligations under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA.  The preamble to the latest resolution expresses the unanimous view of the members of the Security Council noting that the Council is “[C]oncerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006) . . .” 

• The NIE concludes that the decision to suspend its nuclear program “. . . was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.”

• Sustained diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran are essential to prevent further nuclear weapons development and to encourage Iranian transparency on its nuclear program. 

December 5, 2007