Idiot Legal Arguments Section Six

Sixteenth Amendment not adopted: mentioning "The Law that Never Was" by Benson & Beckman: US v. Wm.J. Benson (7th Cir 1991) 941 F2d 598 [one of the authors of Law/Never] amended on other grounds 957 F2d 301; [ Benson convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to four years of prison followed by five years probation. US v. Benson (7th Cir 1995) 67 F3d 641 reh.den 74 F3d 152; it appears he violated the terms of his parole. Benson v. US (ND IL 1997) 969 F.Supp 1129]; M.D. Miller v. US (7th Cir 1988) 868 F2d 236; ("The validity of that process [adopting the 16th Amendment] and if the resulting constitutional amendment are no longer open questions.") US v. Sitka (2d Cir 1988) 845 F2d 43 at 47 cert.den 488 US 827; US v. Thomas (7th Cir 1986) 788 F2d 1250 cert.den 479 US 853 (the leading case; held that the Sec of State's 1913 proclamation of the adoption of the 16th Amendment is conclusive and "is now beyond review"); US v. House (WD Mich 1985) 617 F.Supp 237 aff’d (6th Cir 1986) 787 F2d 593(t)(used Benson as a witness, and thoroughly discussed his book); US v. Wojtas (ND IL 1985) 611 F.Supp 118; US v. Sato (ND IL 1989) 704 F.Supp 816 (the Constitutional provision that Congress will have exclusive authority over DC only means that no state govt has authority over DC but it does not limit Congress's authority to make laws, including tax laws, only to DC); O.L. Brown v. CIR (2/9/97) TC Memo 1987-78 (judge declined to buy a copy); Spoelman v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); US v. Stahl (9th Cir 1986) 792 F2d 1438 cert.den 479 US 1036; Spoelman v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); {Note: The argument in "The Law That Never Was" by Benson & Beckman is a 1913 legal memo worked up for the Sec. of State by the Solicitor of the State Dept regarding the ratifications received from state legislatures for the proposed 16th amendment, noticing that several of these notifications contained tiny typos in reprinting the text of the proposed amendment. The Solicitor advised that, as a state could not amend or change the proposed text but only vote for or against ratification, and that the proposed amendment was available to members of all the legislatures in a number of published copies - most without any typos, and it is not known whether these typos existed in the copies seen by the members of the legislatures before they voted (no state govt ever complained that its vote on ratification would have gone different without the typos), and certainly the ratifications of previous and undoubted amendments also had similar flaws, that the notification of favorable ratifying votes is binding on the Sec of State, etc., it is presumed that all the votes were taken on the correct and proper text and therefore the ratifications are all valid and sufficient to adopt the amendment. The Sec. of State agreed. Contrary to the claims made by Benson & Beckman, there is no evidence that any ratification of any amendment was ever invalidated because of some typo in repeating the proposed amendment, and in fact there is a distinct shortage of precedents for invalidating an Act of Congress because of a comparable typo distinguishing the bills adopted by the House and the Senate. The book was dealt with in detail in US v. Thomas (7th Cir 1986) 788 F2d 1250 cert.den 479 US 853, and one of the co-authors tried to revive the rejected argument simply because he had written that book in US v. Benson (7th Cir 1991) 941 F2d 598, both times the court held that the validity of the adoption of the 16th Amendment was "beyond review".}

other: Coleman v. CIR (7th Cir 1986) 791 F2d 68 (non-specific); M.J. Beckman v. Battin (D Mont 1995) 926 F.Supp 971 [the other author of Law/Never](tried to sue judge for not declaring 16th Amendment invalid) aff’d Beckman v. Greenspan (9th Cir 1996) 83 F3d 426(t), {Martin J. "Red" Beckman, after losing a major battle with the IRS, has become an advocate for truly nutty schemes, including a "law of grammar" system for interpreting the law, jury nullification, and anti-Jewish propaganda, Wall Street Journal, 5/25/95 p.A1}; R.L. Keys v. CIR (9/26/85) 50 TC Memo 1985-507 & P.O. Keys v. CIR (9/26/85) TC Memo 1985-508 (both threatened judge with criminal prosecution for not declaring 16th Amdmt invalid); US v. G.D. Bell (ED Cal unpub 4/30/97) 79 AFTR2d 2784 recons.den 27 F.Supp.2d 1191 (threatened to sue the judge); (suing Clinton, some Congressmen, some other officials, and Rush Limbaugh to make them all declare that the 16th Amendment is invalid) Wells v. Clinton (WD NC unpub 11/15/96) 79 AFTR2d 602 aff'd (4th Cir unpub 6/19/97) 116 F3d 1474(t); Sisk v. CIR (6th Cir 1986) 791 F2d 58; Knoblauch v. CIR (5th Cir 1984) 749 F2d 200 cert.den 474 US 830; US v. Wodtke (ND Iowa 1985) 627 F.Supp 1034 aff'd 871 F2d 1092; Cauvel v. CIR (10/10/89) TC Memo 1989-547; US v. Ferguson (7th Cir 1986) 793 F2d 828 cert.den 479 US 933; Betz v. US (2/3/98) 40 Fed.Claims 286, 81 AFTR2d 611, 98 USTC para 50199 app.dism (FC 1998) 155 F3d 568(t); Axmann v. Ponte (D Neb unpub 1/4/89) 89 USTC para 9306, 63 AFTR2d 966 aff'd 892 F2d 761; (mentioning this argument pointlessly raised in a narcotics prosecution) US v. Norris (4th Cir unpub 2/20/98) 135 F3d 771(t); (tried to deny that the 14th amendment was validly adopted, court held this was a political question which the courts could not consider and which the other branches of govt had settled decisively) US v. R.J. McDonald (9th Cir unpub 10/4/90) 919 F2d 146(t) cert.den 499 US 928; "At the outset, we note that the 16th Amendment has been in existence for 73 years and have been applied by the Supreme Court in countless cases. While this alone is not sufficient to bar judicial inquiry, it is very persuasive on the question of validity. ... Thus, we would require, at this late hour, an exceptionally strong showing of unconstitutional ratification." US v. Foster (7th Cir 1986) 789 F2d 457 cert.den 479 US 883; (tax protester arguments about the adoption of the 16th Amendment, repeating arguments made in "The Law That Never Was", are by now so stale and so long and thoroughly rejected that the court is justified in imposing sanctions amounting to a fine of $5000 and double the usual costs and damages) Pollard v. CIR (11th Cir 1987) 816 F2d 603. The court in a tax fraud case refused to take judicial notice of what were alleged to be thousands of documents, none of them placed in evidence, which were supposedly filed in unspecified courts elsewhere which substatiated in some unspecified way that the Sixteenth Amendment had not been properly ratified. US v. Sugarman (4th Cir unpub 7/31/86) 21 Fed.R.Evid.Serv 379;

that Ohio was not a state for ratifying the 16th Amendment: Bowman v. Govt of the US (ED Penn 1995) 920 F.Supp 623 (discusses 1953 act); Riley v. US (D Kan unpub 7/5/90); McKenney v. Blumenthal (ND Ga unpub 2/23/79) 43 AFTR2d 960, 79 USTC para 9346; US v. Stahl (9th Cir 1986) 792 F2d 1438 cert.den 479 US 1036; Ric. Davis v. CIR (WD Okl unpub 4/13/78) 41 AFTR2d 1376, 78 USTC para 9478; Lorre v. Alexander (WD Tex unpub 8/8/77) 40 AFTR2d 5677, 77 USTC para 9672; Ivey v. US (ED Wisc unpub 8/31/76) 38 AFTR2d 5909, 76 USTC para 9682; Tiffany v. CIR (3/28/78) TC Memo 1978-122; Baker v. CIR (2/14/78) TC Memo 1978-060 (lists cases upholding ratification of 16th Amendmt and statehood of Ohio); US v. Foster (7th Cir 1986) 789 F2d 457 cert.den 479 US 883;: US v. Golden (6th Cir unpub 2/25/86) 786 F2d 1167(t); Tickel v. CIR (ED Tenn unpub 9/10/85) 56 AFTR2d 5969, 85 USTC para 9761 ("Every court that has considered this argument has rejected it.") aff'd (6th Cir 1986) 810 F2d 203; Sisk v. CIR (6th Cir 1986) 791 F2d 58; Knoblauch v. CIR (5th Cir 1984) 749 F2d 200 cert.den 474 US 830; Selders v. CIR (WD Tex unpub 2/14/78) 41 AFTR2d 1088, 42 AFTR2d 5736, 78 USTC para 9295; {This nonsense arises from the fact that Ohio was admitted to the Union circa 1802 but different landmark events in attaining statehood are recorded for different dates, e.g., the statehood convention was held from 1-29 Nov 1802, Congress evidently recognized the statehood on 29 February 1803, its elected officials took their posts on other dates, etc., so that, on the occasion of Ohio's presumed 150th anniversary of statehood, in 1953, the US Congress settled retroactively on the date of 1 March 1803; Act of August 7, 1953, 67 Stat 407 and see 1953 USCCAN page 453 and 2124 (true to form, Congress managed to set the date after the anniversary was passed!) Without examining the Joint Resolution or the legislative history, some nitwits have jumped to the conclusion that Ohio was not a state until 1953 and therefore could not have ratified the 16th Amendment, etc.}

IRC was not "positive law": Ryan v. Bilby (9th Cir 1985) 764 F2d 1325; US v. Kolchev (9th Cir unpub 4/5/94) 21 F3d 1117(t), 73 AFTR2d 1817; Kolchev v. CIR (9th Cir unpub 2/1/95) 75 AFTR2d 839; US v. Wodtke (ND Iowa 1985) 627 F.Supp 1034 aff'd 871 F2d 1092; US v. Dunkel (ND IL unpub 8/30/96) 78 AFTR2d 6529 rev. in part on other grnds (7th Cir unpub 7/1/97) 80 AFTR2d 5148, 97 USTC para 50565; O’Brien v. CIR (6th Cir 1985) 779 F2d 52; US v. Updegrave (ED Penn unpub 5/28/97) 80 AFTR2d 5290, 97 USTC para 50465; US v. Zuger (D Conn 1984) 602 F.Supp 889 aff’d 755 F2d 915 cert.den 474 US 805; Scott v. USA (ND Ind unpub 7/27/84) 84 USTC para 9785; US v. Maczka (WD Mich 1996) 957 F.Supp 988; D.R. Andrews v. CIR (9/2/98) TC Memo 1998-316; Koar v. US (SDNY unpub 8/14/98) 82 AFTR2d 6329, 98 USTC para 50748; Young v. IRS (ND Ind 1984) 596 F.Supp 141 at 149 ("The Internal Revenue Code or 1954 is positive law... Although Congress did not pass the [Internal Revenue] Code as a title [of the USC], it did enact the Internal Revenue Code as a separate Code ... which was then denominated as Title 26 by the House Judiciary Committee.... Finally, even if Title 26 was no itself enacted into positive law, that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void.... This court recognizes that the IRC is positive law applicable to disputes concerning whether taxes are owed by someone like the plaintiff. This court refuses to embrace the plaintiff's position that the tax laws of the US are some kind of hoax designed by the IRS to violation the constitutional rights of US citizens. Quite simply, the court finds plaintiff's position preposterous."); US v. Martin (4th Cir unpub 9/29/97) 127 F3d 1100(t), 97 USTC para 50727 ("in fact [it] has been codified"); Sloan v. US (ND Ind 1985) 621 F.Supp 1072 app. dismissed 812 F2d 1410 (this argument so frivolous it will be penalized); Wellbaum v. US (D Ore unpub 9/20/91); Theron Tucker v. USA & IRS (EDNY unpub 7/6/98) 82 AFTR2d 5796, 98 USTC para 50576; Brown v. US (4/3/96) 35 Fed.Claims 258 aff’d (Fed Cir 1997) 105 F3d 621; cf. US v. Wacker (10th Cir unpub 3/31/99) (in drug prosecution, defendant tried to argue that the US Code is not authorized by, nor based on the laws of, Congress); US v. Bondurant (WD NC unpub 9/14/98) 82 AFTR2d 6980 (in tax evasion case, defendant argued that sections in Title 26 & Title 28 of the US Code were invalid because there were no enacting clauses. "Defendant's arguments are frivolous and totally without merit. First, references to the US Code or the US Code ... are the standard, accepted nomenclature for reference to laws of the US. The fact that federal statutes are enacted in one form [viz. Statutes at Large, chronologically with enacting clauses] and are collected and published for convenient reference in another [viz. the US Code, topically and without enacting clauses] in no way diminishes their force or effect. Second, as the govt has established, each of the statutes in question in its original form contained an enacting clause."); Berkshire Hathaway Inc. v. US (1985) 8 Claims Ct 780 aff’d (Fed Cir 1986) 802 F2d 429 (IRC "is truly positive law"); Palmer v. CIR (10/9/97) TC Memo 1997-462; US v. Tedder (10th Cir 1986) 787 F2d 540; Ryan v. Bilby (9th Cir 1985) 764 F2d 1325 (leading case, "like it or not, the Internal Revenue Code is the law"); ("The Internal Revenue Code was validly enacted by Congress and is fully enforceable.") US v. Studley (9th Cir 1985) 783 F2d 934; ditto US v. Dawes (10th Cir 1989) 874 F2d 746 cert.den 493 US 920 error coram nobis granted on other grounds (10th Cir 1990) 895 F2d 1581; Sherwood v. US (ND Cal unpub 12/9/96); US v. Andra (D Ida 1996) 923 F.Supp 157; Richey v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue (Ind. Tax Ct 1994) 634 NE2d 1375 ("Richey correctly points out that ... Title 26 [the IRC] has not been enacted into positive law. The conclusion he draws from these facts, however, is as fanciful as his other notions. ... he claims Congress enacted the tax laws as private laws applicable only to the District of Columbia. ...That Title 26 is not positive law simply means one must go to the appropriate volume of the US Statutes at Large to be certain of the content of any given statute codified within Title 26. ... He simply assumes that because the Code language is not positive law, the tax laws have no effect on him."); (thinks that federal statutes have to be published in the Federal Register to be valid; contra 44 USC sec. 1501): Theron Tucker v. USA & IRS (EDNY unpub 7/6/98) 82 AFTR2d 5796, 98 USTC para 50576; ditto US v. Schiefen (8th Cir 1998) 139 F3d 638; Hartman v. Switzer (WD Penn 1974) 376 F.Supp 486; ditto Johnson v. Clark (ED Cal unpub 6/19/98) 82 AFTR2d 5194 ("Petitioner is misinformed in taking this position. While federal regulations are required to be published in the Federal Register, federal statutes face no such requirement."); similarly US v. Dietz (4th Cir unpub 3/28/95) 51 F3d 269(t), 75 AFTR2d 1613; (similarly thinking that IRS forms have to be published in the Federal Register) US v. Hicks (9th Cir 1991) 947 F2d 1356; (ditto, this argument is utterly meritless) US v. Barbara Olson (10th Cir unpub 4/14/92) 961 F2d 221(t); similarly ("I find no requirement that [IRS forms] be so published... The duty to report the information required by statute and regulation is not conditioned on the availability of a standardized form prepared by the IRS.") US v. Justis (D Dela unpub 5/10/84) 54 AFTR2d 5455, 84 USTC para 9842; ditto Oakes v. IRS (DDC unpub 4/16/87) 59 AFTR2d 1179, 87 USTC para 9506 ("Finally, there is no requirement that the [IRS] publish tax forms in the Federal Register. Rather the Freedom of Information Act requires that the IRS publish in the Federal Register ... ' descriptions of forms available or the places at which forms may be obtained...' 5 USC sec. 552(a)(1)(c)."); ditto US v. O'Ferrall (D Dela unpub 5/4/84) 54 AFTR2d 5315, 84 USTC para 9843; similarly ("the legal theory on which the motion was based has no merit.") US v. Bentson (9th Cir 1991) 947 F2d 1353 cert.den 504 US 958; similarly Billman v. CIR (9/25/84) 83 TC 534 aff'd (1988) 270 US App DC 124, 847 F2d 887 ("fortunate that he has not been charged with fraud"); similarly Brewer v. US (SDNY 1991) 764 F.Supp 309; (thinks that tax statutes require implementing regulations to be enforceable) Stafford v. CIR (1/28/97) TC Memo 1997-50; ditto Hirsh v. CIR (4/21/97) TC Memo 1997-184; ditto Rude v. Brown (ED Calif unpub 11/5/97) 80 AFTR2d 8301; ditto Carpa v. Smith (D Ariz unpub 7/20/98) 98 USTC para 50627, 82 AFTR2d 5680; ditto ("duty to pay those taxes is manifest on the face of the statutes without any resort to IRS rules, forms or regulations") US v. Bowers (4th Cir 1990) 920 F2d 220; ditto Watts v. IRS (DNJ 1996) 925 F.Supp 271; ditto US v. Hicks (9th Cir 1991) 947 F2d 1356; (seemed to think that "26 CFR" was not published in the Federal Register, contra 44 USC sec. 1510) Wesselman v. CIR (2/28/96) TC Memo 1996-85; (thinks that Treasury delegations of authority have to be printed in the Federal Register) Wolf v. CIR (9th Cir 1993) 4 F3d 709; ditto US v. Saunders (9th Cir 1991) 951 F2d 1065; ditto W.J. Johnston v. US (1st Cir unpub 9/12/90) 915 F2d 1557(t) ("However, under 26 CFR sec. 301.7701-9(b), published at 25 Federal Register 10928, 11/17/60, if a Treasury regulation provides that a duty may be performed by district directors, that constitutes a delegation of authority from the Treasury Secretary to the Commissioner. Since other published Treasury regulations expressly authorize district directors to issue notices of deficiency and to make levies to collect unpaid taxes ... there is no defect in the delegation of authority here.""); similarly Stamos v. CIR (9th Cir unpub 3/4/92) cert.den 506 US 873; similarly Lonsdale v. US (10th Cir 1990) 919 F2d 1440; similarly Cullen v. CIR (9/8/92) TC Memo 1992-516; similarly R.S. Powers v. CIR (12/12/90) TC Memo 1990-623; (thinks IRS summonses have to be printed in Federal Register) Darland v. US (WD Mich unpub 6/29/98) 82 AFTR2d 5679, 98 USTC para 50615; (thinks Internal Revenue Code was only temporarily enacted and is now invalid, or that the IRC is only civil and not criminal law) US v. Studley (9th Cir 1985) 783 F2d 934; (thinks that IRS must publish its interpretive guidelines in the Federal Register) Karpowycz v. US (ND IL 1984) 586 F.Supp 48; similarly Scull v. US (ED Va 1984) 585 F.Supp 956; Hudson v. US (9th Cir 1985) 766 F2d 1288; {The business about "positive law" has significance only with regard to the exact text of laws appearing in codifications such as the Revised Statutes of 1872 and the US Code (first issued in 1924) because the editors of those compilations sometimes "massaged" the precise texts of the statutes passed by Congress in order to make them fit the scheme and style of the arrangement of code sections, so that the text of the Code is only the prima facie text of the law but may be contradicted by reference to the underlying Acts of Congress. In 1 USC sec. 201(a) provision is made that a title of the Code may be enacted into "positive law", this is accomplished by enacting an (enormous) bill setting forth the full text of all the sections of the Code title so that the text of the Code becomes exactly the text enacted by Congress and thereafter amendments are made directly to the Code title instead of to various Acts. As a matter of fact, the current IRC (Internal Revenue Code), which is title 26 of the USC, was originally enacted as one huge Act of Congress in 1954 so it was essentially enacted as positive law but it is not commonly identified as such; however variances between the text in 26 USC and the underlying statutes are only very rarely identified. Some mountebanks argument that if Title 26 is not positive law then it is somehow not really law at all, ignoring the very real and solid nature of the underlying statutes.}

Disagreement with tax law is not a defense to willfulness: US v. Ferguson (SD Ind 1985) 615 F.Supp 8 aff’d 793 F2d 828 cert. denied 479 US 933 (in fact, the disagreement with the tax laws or the notion that the Internal Revenue Code is invalid shows an awareness of the contents of the tax laws and helps prove the element of willfulness); US v. Kraeger (2d Cir 1983) 711 F2d 6; US v. Weninger (10th Cir 1980) 624 F2d 163 cert.den 449 US 1012; US v. Benson (5th Cir 1979) 592 F2d 257; Koar v. US (SDNY unpub 8/14/98) 82 AFTR2d 6329, 98 USTC para 50748; knowledge that these arguments have already been rejected by courts or that the people advocating these arguments have already lost in court undermines a good faith defense: Roth v. CIR (9/23/92) TC Memo 1992-563; Gajewski v. CIR (11/10/76) 67 Tax Ct 181 aff'd (8th Cir 1978) 578 F2d 1383; US v. Condo (9th Cir 1984) 741 F2d 238 cert.den 469 US 1164; (similarly when the same perp persists in putting up losing arguments) Walker alias Theonaleth v. CIR (3/12/96) TC Memo 1996-124; ditto Harrell v. CIR (6/15/98) TC Memo 1998-207; (ignoring professional advice from lawyer or accountant) Ware v. CIR (6/5/84) TC Memo 1984-295; ("It should be pointed out, however, that neither a defendant's disagreement with the law, nor his own belief that such law is unconstitutional, no matter how earnestly held, constitute a defense of good faith misunderstanding or mistake. It is clearly the duty of all citizens to obey the law whether they agree with it or not. ... The defendant contends that his personal belief in what the law is or should be supersedes the federal Constitution and statutes as construed and applied by the Supreme Court. If each citizen is a law unto himself, government will exist in name only.") US v. O.W. Ware (10th Cir 1979) 608 F2d 400; (confusion or misunderstanding of the details of tax laws or of one's obligations under them is distinct from an opinion that the tax law is unconstitutional) US v. House (WD Mich 1985) 617 F.Supp 232 aff'd 787 F2d 593(t); (it is possible that the perp's naive reliance on a tax-evasion guru could be used to defend against a charge of fraudulent intent but it cannot possibly defend against the fact that the perp failed to file his tax return, which does not depend upon intent) Nilson v. CIR (10/21/85) TC Memo 1985-535; (perp cannot offer as mitigation that he relied on the advice of certain lawyers, although it appears that he had some slight contact with each of them there is no evidence of the sort of intensive relationship, including full disclosure, that would make a good faith defense) US v. Masat (5th Cir 1991) 948 F2d 923 cert.den 506 US 835; (the facts that the perp had attended tax protester gatherings and had tried to use worthless funny money to pay her debts negated a good faith defense) US v. Grosshans (6th Cir 1987) 821 F2d 1247 cert.den 484 US 987; (altho some provisions of the tax law are sufficiently murky to justify litigation, the basic requirement that everyone receiving income above a certain minimum from any source must file returns and pay taxes is clear beyond dispute) US v. Melton (4th Cir unpub 3/8/96) 86 F3d 1153(t), 77 AFTR2d 2361 cert.den 519 US 820; (filing a false W-4 and failing to file a tax return evidences not a different interpretation but a willful breach of the tax law) Rowlee v. CIR (6/15/83) 80 TC 1111; (mere omission to file, without any sign of dishonesty or concealment, is insufficient to sustain a charge of tax fraud) Kotmair v. CIR (6/19/86) 86 TC 1253; ("However, a pattern of consistent failures to file for several years is strong evidence of fraud.") Harrell v. CIR (6/15/98) TC Memo 1998-207;similarly (mere failure to file a return, without more, does not show fraud but the addition of any other hanky-panky such as offering long-discredited protester arguments or furtive financial practices will indicate fraudulent intent) Sherrer v. CIR (4/14/99) TC Memo 1999-122; (having filed returns and paid taxes in previous years, perp could not pretend that he was ignorant of the general duty of filing such returns, etc.) US v. Bowers (4th Cir 1990) 920 F2d 220; similarly US v. Ferguson (7th Cir 1985) 793 F2d 828 cert.den 479 US 933; similarly US v. Trowbridge (9th Cir unpub 3/26/97) 110 F3d 71(t) cert.den 520 US 1235; similarly US v. Hart (ND Ind 1987) 673 F.Supp 932; similarly US v. Shields (8th Cir 1981) 642 F2d 230 cert.den 454 US 848; Wilber v. CIR (8/31/87) TC Memo 1987-439 aff'd (8th Cir unpub 11/10/88) 871 F2d 1092(t); US v. Rifen (1978) 577 F2d 1111; Cavanaugh v. CIR (8/19/91) TC Memo 1991-407 aff'd (10th Cir unpub 2/9/93) 986 F2d 1426(t); Jenny v. CIR (1/3/83) TC Memo 1983-1; "We believe an ordinary person would know that attempting to avoid payment of taxes is unlawful." US v. R. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 11/22/95) 72 F3d 138(t), 79 AFTR2d 1045. Filing W-4 forms falsely claiming many imaginary dependents is sufficient evidence of fraud. Wiggins-El v. CIR (9/10/81) TC Memo 1981-495; ditto Coulter v. CIR (4/15/92) TC Memo 1992-224; similarly supposedly divesting self of all seizable properties by fraudulent conveyance (deeding to near relative "for $1 and other considerations" after the IRS began its investigations) is a sign of fraudulent intent. Cavanaugh v. CIR (8/19/91) TC Memo 1991-407 aff'd (10th Cir unpub 2/9/93) 986 F2d 1426(t); similarly going to considerable lengths to conceal transactions and assets. Harrell v. CIR (6/15/98) TC Memo 1998-207; Wilber v. CIR (8/31/87) TC Memo 1987-439 aff'd (8th Cir unpub 11/10/88) 871 F2d 1092(t); Cupp v. CIR (10/14/75) 65 Tax Ct 68 aff'd (3d Cir 1977) 559 F2d 1207; having received a letter from the IRS assuring the perp that the tax is valid and constitutional and a letter from his employer that the weight of authority requires withholding taxes from his paycheck negates the defense of honestly not believing that the tax applied to him. Coulter v. CIR (4/15/92) TC Memo 1992-224; ditto US v. Rifen (1978) 577 F2d 1111; similarly having been notified by letter from the IRS that he is liable for taxes negates "good faith" defense that he thought maybe he wasn't. US v. Willie (10th Cir 1991) 941 F2d 1384 cert.den 502 US 1106; having previously lost a tax case on similar arguments negates good faith defense. Graber v. US (SD Iowa 1997) 993 F.Supp 685; being aware that his anti-tax gurus had been convicted of tax evasion negates good faith defense. US v. Crosson (ED Penn unpub 12/20/95); "The fact that the plaintiffs proceeded in this action without the assistance of an attorney does not insulate them from the [good faith] requirements of [FRCP] Rule 11. Any research on the part of the plaintiffs would have clearly shown that it has no chance of success in arguing that they were not subject to the federal income tax laws." Pottorf v. Bryan (D Kan unpub 5/18/87); perp’s failure to keep appointments for IRS interviews negates good faith defense. US v. Crosson (ED Penn unpub 12/20/95); similarly perp's refusal to allow IRS to examine his business ledgers on the pretext that because he refused to regard paper money as real money his ledgers did not show any dollar amounts. Wilber v. CIR (8/31/87) TC Memo 1987-439 aff'd (8th Cir unpub 11/10/88) 871 F2d 1092(t); perp’s refusal to file tax returns or pay taxes for several years, which persists because of his harebrained arguments, is a sufficient reason for the bankruptcy court to dismiss his petition and refuse him the protection of the bankruptcy law, since his available assets to pay his creditors cannot possibly be evaluated until his tax liability can be known. In re Shugrue (Bankr., ND Tex 1998) 221 Bankr.Rptr 394; ditto In re Cobb (Bankr. MD Fla 1998) 216 Bankr.Rptr 676; claim of innocent ignorance of the law is negated by the fact that the mountebank had been ordered by courts and by govt agencies to cease his scam, and that he even boasted that he was ignoring these orders. US v. Hildebrand (8th Cir 1998) 152 F3d 756; similarly such pretense is negated by the mountebank's own claim to have done legal research and his obvious usage of Black's Law Dictionary. US v. Fulbright (9th Cir 1997) 105 F3d 443 cert.den 520 US 1236; similarly when the tax evader "purports to be familiar with the tax laws". Blaty v. CIR (10/1/84) TC Memo 1984-518; [in one instance of imposing a fine under Rule 11, the court said, "An example of the frivolity of these filings is illustrated by the frequent bald citations to the Constutition of the US, the UCC, and any nearby Legal Dictionary." Stoecklin v. US (MD Fla unpub 11/7/97) 80 AFTR2d 8207]; even though perp is pro se, the court cases he misapplies clearly show that his position is wrong. Tornichio v. US (ND Ohio unpub 3/12/98) 81 AFTR2d 1377, 98 USTC para 50299; similarly tax evader's very convoluted research into ancient coinage laws evidenced his wrongful intent. US v. Shields (8th Cir 1981) 642 F2d 230 cert.den 454 US 848; fact that tax evader had advanced degrees with Phi Beta Kappa honors negated his good faith defense that he didn't understand simple IRS instructions and words like dollars. Stout v. CIR (3/3/86) TC Memo 1986-80; similarly tax evader's own testimony that he had first "conducted a very careful study" of reading several tax protester manuals (but evidently not a single conventional lawbook on taxation) effectively established that his tax evasion was willful and deliberate. US v. O.W. Ware (10th Cir 1979) 608 F2d 400; the courts have noticed when a litigant was using canned pleadings. US v. Schiefen (D SoDak 1995) 926 F.Supp 877 aff'd (8th Cir 1996) 81 F3d 166 mand.denied 522 US 1074; (and using canned pleadings so mindlessly that the defendant has not altered papers that speak of him as the plaintiff and ask for summary judgment against the defendant) Langseth v. CIR (9/19/83) TC Memo 1983-576; ("The Court suspects that the debtor has been overly active in searching the Internet for the latest batch of crazy and absurd pleadings created by the latest inventive tax protester group.... His pleadings look like they came off the latest web page for tax protesters and, as the Court has stated more than once, they make No Sense.") In re Shugrue (Bankr., ND Tex 1998) 221 Bankr.Rptr 394; "It is apparent that these cases are not mere isolated incidents with a peculiar coincidental similarity .... These tax protesters with their mass-produced attachments, complaints, motions and memoranda, all march to a common drummer." Vaughn v. US (WD La 1984) 589 F.Supp 1528; ditto In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; ditto US v. Schiefen (D SD 1995) 926 F.Supp 877 aff’d 81 F3d 166 mand.denied 522 US 1074; "The language used by Plaintiff in this case is very similar to the language used by other persons ... not only in this district but throughout the US. It is not difficult, based upon this widespread use of the terms and the similarity of the pleadings, to conclude that there is ongoing communications among persons espousing these theories." R. Jones v. T.G. Watson (ND Ohio unpub 9/29/97); "The filing of frivolous lawsuits merely to protest the assessment of federal income tax has become a new and unpleasant indoor sport, particularly at a time when court dockets are crowded with cases of merit. The issues raised by the plaintiff in this action have been raised and adversely decided many times before. While consideration is given to the fact that the plaintiff is representing himself, the filing of a suit pro se does not give the plaintiff the right to proceed frivolously. Parties may be assessed reasonable expenses and attorney's fees under FRCP rule 11 and 28 USC sec. 2412 and the court finds that such an award is appropriate in this case. ... Would that law, common or otherwise, also authorize assessment of a penalty upon plaintiff for the time and trouble to which his frivolous action has subjected the court." McKinney v. Regan (MD La 1994) 599 F.Supp 126, 55 AFTR2d 1509, 85 USTC para 9479. Where tax protester's pleadings, submitted by their lawyer, claimed that their arguments had never been addressed by any federal court, the court quoted at length from an opinion of a circuit court of another circuit in a case involving the same arguments and the same lawyer. Charczuk v. CIR (10th Cir 1985) 771 F2d 471;

Some of this argument arises from a serious misunderstanding of the Cheek decision, which misunderstanding has been widely repeated throughout tax scofflaw propaganda: In 1980, John L. Cheek, an airline pilot who had previously paid his income taxes, abruptly stopped filing tax returns and even filed a very unsuccessful challenge to the entire notion of income tax; Cheek v. Doe (ND IL 1986) 110 FRD 420 aff'd in part (7th Cir 1987) 828 F2d 395 cert.den 484 US 955; therafter he was convicted for numerous tax violations, and appealed on the grounds that the trial court should have not have instructed the jury to disregard his opinion that the income tax law was invalid as might relate to the willfulness of violating the tax law. The Circuit Court rejected that argument, US v. Cheek (7th Cir 1989) 882 F2d 1263, but the US Supreme Court held that the jury could at least hear the defendant explain how he thought the tax laws were invalid and then decide for themselves the issue of willfulness (and it ordered a new trial), Cheek v. US (1991) 498 US 192, 112 L.Ed.2d 617, 111 S.Ct 604. However, the Circuit Court, in transmitting the case back to the trial court for a new trial, emphasized some points made by the Supreme Court: "Tax evaders who persist in their frivolous beliefs, such as that wages are not income or that FRNs do not constitute cash or income, should not be encouraged by the [Supreme] Court's decision in Cheek or our decision today. While a defendant is now permitted to argue that his failure to file tax returns and to pay his income taxes was the result of his incredible misunderstanding of the tax law's applicability, the govt remains free to present evidence demonstrating that he knew what the law required but simply chose to disregard those duties.." US v. Cheek (7th Cir 1991) 931 F2d 1206; in the new trial the jury was not as gullible as Cheek had hoped and he was sentenced to a year and a day in prison and a fine of $62G, and his attempt to appeal this new conviction was very unsuccessful. US v. Cheek (7th Cir 1993) 3 F3d 1057 cert.den 510 US 1112; as a result of his imprisonment his career as an airline pilot was terminated. Cheek v. American Airlines Inc. (7th Cir unpub 6/25/96) 89 F3d 838(t) cert.denied 519 US 993. A court was permitted to tell the jury that the perp's opinion that tax laws are unconstitutional cannot constitute a good faith defense, and the resulting conviction for multiple counts of tax evasion upheld. US v. M.L. Lindsay (10th Cir 7/1/99) _F3d_, 99 USTC para 50648, 84 AFTR2d 5102 ; court can instruct jury that they can consider whether the defendant's notions about tax laws are reasonable as a factor in evaluating whether he held those opinions in good faith. US v. D.D. Murphy (7th Cir unpub 6/10/99); but there is a difference between a plausible misunderstanding of the meaning of the tax law and the willful failure to comply with it as a challenge to its validity, as the defendant's previous filing of tax returns demonstrates that he was aware that the law required the filing of tax returns then his subsequent deliberate non-filing demonstrated the willfulness and his theories about the law's constitutionality were immaterial. US v. Masat (5th Cir 1991) 948 F2d 923 cert.den 506 US 835;

IRS was not a proper govt agency: (because created by Sec of Treasury): Young v. IRS (ND Ind 1984) 596 F.Supp 141 (because the Sec. of the Treasury renamed the Bureau of Internal Revenue as the IRS in 1953, pursuant to the 1949 Reorganization Act but without a statute specifically changing the name - which would really have been unnecessary for such a cosmetic change - but in the next year's appropriation for the Dept of the Treasury, Congress used the name IRS [5/11/54, 68 Stat 86] thereby ratifying this change); similarly Snyder v. IRS (ND Ind 1984) 596 F.Supp 240; (similarly because IRS not mentioned in Constitution) US v. Zuger (D Conn 1984) 602 F.Supp 889 aff’d 755 F2d 915 cert.den 474 US 805; similarly J.B. Smith v. US, IRS, et al. (D. Ida unpub 7/30/93); similarly (tried to argue that "there is no such thing as the Internal Revenue Service, for whatever help such an argument would give the plaintiffs... We bear in mind that the IRS is organized to carry out the broad responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury ... for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws. By whatever name, the Secretary of the Treasury functions to enforce the tax laws.") Axmann v. Ponte (D Neb unpub 1/4/89) 89 USTC para 9306, 63 AFTR2d 966 aff'd 892 F2d 761; similarly (that IRS agent is not "an officer of the US nor that the IRS is an agency of the US") Onkka v. Herman (D Neb unpub 9/19/97 & 10/17/97) 80 AFTR2d 6860 - previously in the same case (D Neb unpub 6/5/97) 80 AFTR2d 5024 (the argument that the defendant IRS agent "has not proven himself to be an officer of the IRS is disingenuous to say the least. Finally, the court is willing to take judicial notice of the fact that the IRS is an agency of the USA." and noted that the defendant was represented by a Dept of Justice lawyer who had filed pleadings that he was an officer of the IRS which is an agency of the US govt, "these are fairly good indications"); similarly D.L. Young v. Boeing Co. (D.Kan unpub 4/12/95) 75 AFTR2d 2408 ("According to the plaintiffs, the IRS is a private enterprise operation and not an agency of the US govt. This argument is, of course, patently absurd."); that IRS is a foreign or subversive organization. Ric. Davis v. CIR (WD Okl unpub 4/13/78) 41 AFTR2d 1376, 78 USTC para 9478; similarly Bell v. Agents for IMF (ED Cal unpub 11/7/95) 76 AFTR2d 7543; similarly Morgan v. IMF, IRS, et al. (D Ida unpub 10/6/95) 76 AFTR2d 7040; similarly Vaillancourt [& the People of the Republic Union State named Arizona] v. Bentsen (D.Ariz unpub 2/25/94) 73 AFTR2d 1423; similarly Ayres v. Agents for IMF IRS (D Colo unpub 7/24/98) 98 USTC para 50637, 82 AFTR2d 5688; similarly Steinman v. IRS (D Ariz 6/5/96) 78 AFTR2d 5380; similarly US v. Higgins (8th Cir 1993) 987 F2d 543; similarly Alexander v. Agents for IMF (NDNY unpub 12/31/96) 79 AFTR2d 658; Lorre v. Alexander (WD Tex unpub 8/8/77) 40 AFTR2d 5677, 77 USTC para 9672; similarly Green v. Winkler (SD Fla unpub 12/5/96) 78 AFTR2d 7630; (that IRS works for Interpol) In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; (tax protester in Virginia tried to sue naming as defendant "Internal Revenue Service of Puerto Rico, Trust #62" on myth that IRS exists only in Puerto Rico) Bartrug v. Rubin (ED Va 1997) 986 F.Supp 332; ditto W.E. Johnson v. Starkey (ED NC unpub 9/3/98) 82 AFTR2d 6950; ditto Tabron v. Starkey (ED NC unpub 8/24/98) 82 AFTR2d 6448; ditto Alan v. IRS of Puerto Rico (D Haw unpub 9/10/97) 80 AFTR2d 6688; ditto In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; ditto Waddell v. Rubin (WD Ky unpub 4/21/97) 79 AFTR2d 2787; similarly Wesselman v. CIR (2/28/96) TC Memo 1996-85; similarly R. Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96); that IRS was a corporation and not a govt agency: Salman v. Dept of the Treasury-IRS (D Nev 4/11/95) 899 F.Supp 471 & (D Nev 6/5/95) 899 F.Supp 473; Scott v. USA (ND Ind unpub 7/27/84) 84 USTC para 9785; In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; Hughes v. Hickam (WD Mo unpub 5/23/97) 79 AFTR2d 3151 (IRS is not a corp and not subject to the UCC) Cole v. Higgins (D Ida unpub 2/27/95) 75 AFTR2d 1479 aff'd (9th Cir unpub 4/1/96) 82 F3d 422(t), 77 AFTR2d 1586; (tax protester's use of UCC "reservation of rights" phrase after his signature on tax return made the return ineffective for obtaining a refund for him) US v. E.M. Nash (6th Cir 1999) 175 F3d 429; (both IRS and the US govt are corporations) Wardell v. IRS (D Ore unpub 10/20/95) 76 AFTR2d 7290; that IRS was not able to operate because not registered as if a corporation. A.J. Barnett v. USA (10th Cir unpub 9/14/93) 5 F3d 545(t) cert. denied 510 US 1122; (a federal govt agency -- including the IRS, the Federal Land Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, etc. -- is an "instrumentality of the United States" and not a foreign corporation nor required to register as a corporation with the state govt.) Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Parson (1989) 116 Ida 545, 777 P2d 1218; ditto Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Gefroh (No.Dak 1986) 390 NW2d 46; ["Because Congress has not constituted the IRS as a body corporate and has not authorized suit against the IRS in its given name, an action against the IRS is deemed to be one against the United States." Gardens v. US et al. (WD Mo unpub 12/15/97) 81 AFTR2d 584, 98 USTC para 50188; ditto D.L. Young v. Boeing Co. (D.Kan unpub 4/12/95) 75 AFTR2d 2408; claiming that the IRS Commissioner and the "Commissioner of Internal Revenue" are two distinct and different personages. Salman v. Sec of the Treasury (D. Nev unpub 1/2/97) 79 AFTR2d 793; claiming that a Freedom of Information Act request can compel the IRS to work up an ad hoc history of its statutory authorities. Salman v. US-IRS (9th Cir unpub 11/29/90); ditto Klinge v. IRS (WD Mich 1995) 906 F.Supp 434; ditto Theron Tucker v. USA & IRS (EDNY unpub 7/6/98) 82 AFTR2d 5796, 98 USTC para 50576; or to provide the perp with copies of all the tax laws. Lampkin v. IRS (WDNC unpub 2/24/97) 79 AFTR2d 1514; or to provide copies of IRS regs already published in the Federal Register or CFR. Allison v. US IRS (D Mont unpub 4/8/97) 79 AFTR2d 2673 aff'd (9th Cir unpub 12/18/97) 81 AFTR2d 302; [FOIA does not require govt agency to churn up documents that did not already exist or which it did not already possess. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1979) 445 US 136 at 152; NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 US 132 at 161-162; Salman v. Sec of the Treasury (D. Nev unpub 1/2/97) 79 AFTR2d 793; ("the govt ... has no obligation to do legal research for [the perp] and ... copies of the tax code are available in numerous libraries.") US v. Schiefen (D SD 1995) 926 F.Supp 877 aff’d 81 F3d 166 mand.denied 522 US 1074; it is a sufficient response to a perp's FOIA request that the IRS work up its own legal history and proof of validity of the 16th Amendment and of the tax laws and their applicability to the perp for the IRS to send him a short letter stating that the 16th Amendment and the IRC were valid and that the IRS was authorized to assess and collect income tax from him, similarly sufficient response to a request for a copy of the tax laws to tell him to go to a library, bookstore or GPO outlet.. Klinge v. IRS (WD Mich 1995) 906 F.Supp 434. And the crank is not permitted to bring a lawsuit over the IRS failure to gratify his FOIA request until all his administrative remedies under the FOIA are exhausted. C.L. Fisher v. Niemiec (D Ariz unpub 4/30/95). ("This file is beginning to acquire the status of immortality and apparently no sharpened stakes are at hand.") US v. Craig (D. No.Dak unpub 12/27/93) 73 AFTR2d 554; (cannot sue to compel IRS to answer his demands for legal arguments) Fostvedt v. US (10th Cir 1992) 978 F2d 1201 cert.den 507 US 988; (nor base his refusal to pay taxes on grounds that IRS did not respond to his demands for its legal history) Theron Tucker v. USA & IRS (EDNY unpub 7/6/98) 82 AFTR2d 5796, 98 USTC para 50576; ditto Hezel v. US (WD Tenn unpub 6/17/98) 80 AFTR2d 5229, 97 USTC para 50588 aff'd (6th Cir unpub 9/21/98) 165 F3d 27(t), 82 AFTR2d 6405, 98 USTC para 50778; Bey v. Smith (SDNY unpub 8/1/97)]; (argument that BATF, not IRS, is authorized to collect income tax, based on CFR tables) Russell v. US (WD Mich unpub 11/23/94) 75 AFTR2d 495, 95 USTC para 50029; R. Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96); similarly Stafford v. CIR (1/28/97) TC Memo 1997-50 ("The Parallel Tables of authorities is merely an ancillary finding device included in the Code of Federal Regulations."); similarly In re Angstadt (Bankr. ED Penn unpub 8/17/94); similarly US v. Klimek (ED Penn unpub 4/29/92); similarly Reese v. CIR (6/5/95) TC Memo 1995-244; similarly US v. Vanderzand (WD Mich unpub 6/3/97); US v. Cochrane (9th Cir 1993) 985 F2d 1027; Weigandt v. US (ED Wash unpub 1/4/96) 77 AFTR2d 724 aff'd (9th Cir unpub 10/9/96) 78 AFTR2d 6941 ("devoid of merit"); US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100; (IRS is a proper govt agency and its tax liens are valid regardless of whether it is charged the usual local filing fees) Salman v. Jameson (D Nev unpub 10/7/94)

CFR tables of authorities used in argument: Russell v. US (WD Mich unpub 11/23/94) 75 AFTR2d 495, 95 USTC para 50029 ("The [CFR] list does not purport to limit the applicability of statutory sections."; also attempted to argue that an unambiguous statute could not be enforced without a corresponding reg, but 26 USC sec. 7805 requires only that the Sec. of the Treasury "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations"); US v. Ross (7th Cir unpub 4/13/95) 52 F3d 329(t); Morgan v. US (MD Fla unpub 9/16/96) 78 AFTR2d 6633; US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100; (erroneously claiming that a CFR section had not been published in Federal Register, when it had, years ago -- moreover the statute makes the CFR a special edition of the Federal Register) US v. Novotny (10th Cir unpub 6/5/92) 968 F2d 22(t) cert.den 507 US 909; ditto Wesselman v. CIR (2/28/96) TC Memo 1996-85; Stafford v. CIR (1/28/97) TC Memo 1997-50 ("The Parallel Tables of authorities is merely an ancillary finding device included in the Code of Federal Regulations."); On a slightly related topic, some nitwits have argued that congressional passage (and presidential signing) of Joint Resolutions do not enact "law", on the pretext that only a "bill" can become a law (this argument was articulated by the RoT, for example, with reference to both the annexation of Texas and the passage of the Gold Repeal of 1933); however the Congress itself regards a Joint Resolution (as distinguished from a Concurrent Resolution or from a Simple Resolution) to be the equivalent of a bill in enacting law and has used it for a number of purposes, including revising laws previously enacted as Bills, for various appropriations, and (without the President's signature) for proposing amendments to the Constitution ; e.g. current USHR Manual sec. 397 (with references to Hinds & Cannon's Precedents), "How Our Laws Are Passed" (repeatedly reprinted by Congress); the US Attorney General said as much in 1854, 6 Op. US Atty-Gen 680; and the Supreme Court has treated laws enacted by Joint Resolutions the same as laws enacted as bills.

wages not "income": US v. Connor (3d Cir 1990) 898 F2d 942 cert.den 497 US 1029; Connor v. CIR (2d Cir 1985) 770 F2d 17 (argument is so frivolous that it can be penalized); Wm. Belz v. US (6th Cir unpub 3/10/86) 787 F2d 588(t); Casper v. CIR (10th Cir 1986) 805 F2d 902; Wilcox v. CIR (9th Cir 1988) 848 F2d 1007 ("First, wages are income. ... Second, paying taxes is not voluntary."); US v. Jones (D NJ 1995) 877 F.Supp 907; Fox v. CIR (2/1/93) TC Memo 1993-37 summ.judg. granted (2/26/96) TC Memo 1996-79; US v. Taylor (6th Cir unpub 3/29/93); O’Brien v. CIR (6th Cir 1985) 779 F2d 52; Wellbaum v. US (D Ore unpub 9/20/91); Young v. IRS (ND Ind 1984) 596 F.Supp 141 ("in the clearest language ... wages are income"); US v. Gerads (8th Cir 1993) 999 F2d 1255 cert.den 510 US 1193; US v. Koliboski (7th Cir 1984) 732 F2d 1328; Brown v. US (4/3/96) 35 Fed.Claims 258 aff’d (Fed Cir 1997) 105 F3d 621; Stubbs v. CIR (11th Cir 1986) 797 F2d 936; Palmer v. CIR (10/9/97) TC Memo 1997-462; Beard v. CIR (1984) 82 Tax Ct 766 (nr. 60) aff’d (6th Cir 1986) 793 F2d 139; L.R. Olson v. US (9th Cir 1985) 760 F2d 1003 (tried to deduct all his living expenses as a"cost of labor"); Koar v. US (SDNY unpub 8/14/98) 82 AFTR2d 6329, 98 USTC para 50748; ("It has been universally held that wages paid for labor and services are taxable income.") Beard v. US (ED Mich 1984) 589 F.Supp 881; Merritt v. CIR (ED Tenn unpub 2/8/84) 53 AFTR2d 619, 84 USTC para 9258 (26 USC sec. 61 "unambiguously" includes compensation for services as taxable income); Lonsdale v. US (10th Cir 1990) 919 F2d 1440 (leading case); Stoecklin v. CIR (11th Cir 1989) 865 F2d 1221; US v. Rhodes (MD Penn 1996) 921 F.Supp 261 aff'd (3d Cir 1996) 101 F3d 693(t) & (3d Cir 1997) 107 F3d 9(t); McNair v. Eggers (11th Cir 1986) 788 F2d 1509; Jensen v. US (D Mass unpub 3/1/84) 53 AFTR2d 1067, 84 USTC para 9283; Holker v. US (8th Cir 1984) 737 F2d 751; Collorafi v. US (EDNY unpub 12/2/83) 53 AFTR2d 464, 84 USTC para 9107; (court said in capital letters that "WAGES ARE INCOME") US v. Dube (7th Cir 1987) 820 F2d 886; US v. Koliboski (7th Cir 1984) 732 F2d 1328; (perp argued that as a laborer "engaged in a common law occupation" his wages were not taxable; "Federal courts have all agreed that wages or compensation for services constitute income and the individuals receiving income are subject to the federal income tax, regardless of its nature.") US v. Melton (4th Cir unpub 3/8/96) 86 F3d 1153(t), 77 AFTR2d 2361 cert.den 519 US 820; Peth v. Breitzman (ED Wis 1985) 611 F.Supp 50 (this plaintiff later convicted for printing fake money orders); US v. Jones (D NJ 1995) 877 F.Supp 907 aff’d 74 F3d 1228; Mathes v. CIR (1986) 252 US App DC 131, 788 F2d 33 cert.den 479 US 972; Roth v. CIR (9/23/92) TC Memo 1992-563; Baronowski v. US Govt thru the CIR (ED La unpub 3/10/86) 58 AFTR2d 5172, 86 USTC para 9436; Bixler v. CIR (7/23/96) TC Memo 1996-329; ("legal garbage ... uniformly resulting in decisions against the protesters") Weller v. CIR (8/5/85) TC Memo 1985-387; ("Courts are in no way obligated to tolerate arguments that thoroughly defy common sense" - both the lawyer and his client subjected to very heavy fines for frivolous pleadings) Charczuk v. CIR (10th Cir 1985) 771 F2d 471; US v. Taylor (6th Cir unpub 3/29/93); Rowlee v. CIR (6/15/83) 80 TC 1111 (the reference to "gain" in the Eisner v. Macomber decision is dicta since the case dealt with taxing stock dividends, and is refuted by the words of Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert [1913] 231 US 399 at 415); ditto US v. Rhodes (MD Penn 1996) 921 F.Supp 261 aff'd (3d Cir 1996) 101 F3d 693(t) & (3d Cir 1997) 107 F3d 9(t); Lovell v. US (7th Cir 1984) 755 F2d 517; In re Weatherley (Bankr. E.D. Penn 1994) 169 Bankr.Rptr 555, 25 Bankr.Ct.Dec 1427; US v. House (WD Mich 1985) 617 F.Supp 232 aff'd 787 F2d 593(t); Luesse v. US (D Minn unpub 3/19/84) 53 AFTR2d 1329, 84 USTC para 9389; Walker alias Theonaleth v. CIR (3/12/96) TC Memo 1996-124; Walker alia Theonaleth v. CIR (4/5/93) TC Memo 1993-138 aff'd (2d Cir 1994) 19 F3d 9(t); Ball v. US (D. Ore unpub 8/24/93) 72 AFTR2d 5958, 93 USTC para 50665 sanctions added (D. Ore unpub 10/5/93) 72 AFTR2d 6442; US v. Schiefen (D SD 1995) 926 F.Supp 877 aff’d 81 F3d 166 mand.denied 522 US 1074; Baker v. CIR (10/16/95) TC Memo 1995-495 aff’d (5th Cir 1996) 98 F3d 1338; ("These are tired arguments.") Krah v. US (ND IL unpub 12/11/87) 71A AFTR2d 3001, 88 USTC para 9147; ditto Coleman v. CIR (7th Cir 1986) 791 F2d 68; Hodges v. CIR (7/6/98) TC Memo 1998-242; ditto Cullinane v. CIR (1/4/99) TC Memo 1999-2; (this argument raised in criminal appeal was "frivolous square" and perp would be fined for meritless appeal under a provision that usually applied only to civil appeals) US v. A.D. Cooper (7th Cir 1999) 170 F3d 691. The perp argument that taxable "income" is limited to business (or corporate) profits is wrong, being based on some very early court decisions that dealt only with corporations and not with individuals. Tornichio v. US (ND Ohio unpub 3/12/98) 81 AFTR2d 1377, 98 USTC para 50299; similarly Ghalardi Income Tax Education Foundation [& Webber] v. CIR (12/30/98) TC Memo 1998-460; in one instance the judge himself gave the tax protester copies of some precedent decisions that exploded his arguments but the perp persisted in his futile arguments with the result that the court imposed a very substantial fine ($10G) for frivolous and dilatory litigation. Kinkade v. CIR (6/1/99) TC Memo 1999-180