Religion in the Public Schools


Introduction
Background: Religious Liberty in America
Prayer in Public School
Religion in the Curriculum
Evolution vs. Creationism
Teaching About Religious Holidays
Religious Displays on School Property
Released Time Programs
Student Religious Clubs
Use of School Facilities by Outside Religious Organizations and Clubs
Distribution of Religious Materials by Students
Distribution of Religious Material and Proselytizing by Non-school Personnel
Dress Codes
Teachers' Religious Expression
ADL Can Help

Education

Religion in the Public Schools RULE

End Notes

¹ http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1650.htm

² Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290, 390 (2000) (internal marks omitted).

³ Id. at 318 (C. J. Rehnquist, dissenting).

⁴ See Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 (1973).

⁵ Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990) (internal marks and citations omitted).

⁶ Id. at 879.

⁷ Id. 872.

⁸ School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).

⁹ Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 455 U. S. 913 (1982).

¹⁰ Herdahl v. Pontotoc County School District, 933 F. Supp 582, 588 (N. D. Miss. 1996). See also Hall v. Board of School Com'rs of Conecuh County, 656 F. 2d 999, 1000 (5th Cir. 1981).

¹¹ Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985).

¹² But see Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F. 3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001); Bown v. Gwinnett County School Dist., 112 F. 3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997). The courts in both cases found that moment of silence statutes passed the Lemon test because they did not have a religious purpose. In upholding a Virginia statute requiring observance of a daily "minute of silence" for students to "meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity," the court in Gilmore found that the statute had the non-religious purposes of permitting non-religious meditation and accommodating religion. It further found that the legislature took Jaffree into consideration in passing the statute and there was no evidence of the "minute of silence being used for religious observance." In upholding the Georgia "Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act" that requires a period of quiet reflection in public schools at the beginning of each school day, the court in Gwinnett found that the legislative purpose of the act was not religious, in large part because the statute required a moment of silence only, and had specifically eliminated references to prayer found in a predecessor statute.

¹³ Santa Fe Independent School Dist., 530 U. S. 290.

¹⁴ Doe v. Duncanville Independent School Dist., 70 F. 3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).

¹⁵ Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F. 2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989).

¹⁶ Duncanville Independent School Dist., v. John Doe, 994 F. 2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
¹⁷ Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992). See Santa Fe Independent School Dist., 530 U. S. 290.

¹⁸ Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F. 2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 863 (1981). See Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290.

¹⁹ Santa Fe Independent School Dist., 530 U. S. 290; Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist., 88 F. 3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996).

²⁰ Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 37 F. 3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994).

²¹ Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, (1993) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981)).

²² Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F. 2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).

²³ Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983).

²⁴ Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education, 171 F. 3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999).

²⁵ Schempp, 374 U. S. 203.

²⁶ Gibson v. Lee County School Board, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426 (M. D. Fla. 1998).

²⁷ Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 932 (D. N. J. 1993).

²⁸ Schempp, 374 U. S. 203; Hall, 656 F. 2d 999; Gibson, 1 F. Supp. 1426; Herdahl, 933 F. Supp. at 595. ²⁹ Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422 (W. D. Va. 1983).

³⁰Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 827 F. 2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).

³¹ The difficulty of monitoring what actually occurs inside the classroom puts concerned administrators and parents at a disadvantage. The only way for administrators to become aware of problems and constitutional violations without personally monitoring classes would be through student or parent complaints, which may not always be forth-coming.

³² Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 827 F. 2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1066 (1988); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F. 2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 826 (1985); Williams v. Bd. of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (D. C. W. Va.), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975).

³³ Schempp, 374 U. S. 203. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).

³⁴ Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988). See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 228 F. 3d 1003, (9th Cir 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1653 (2001); C. H. ex rel. Z. H. v. Oliva, 195 F. 3d 167 (3rd Cir 1999), rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated on other grounds by C. H. v. Oliva, 226 F. 3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2000). See also Peck v. Baldwinsville School Bd. of Educ., 2001 WL 303755 (2nd Cir. 2001).

³⁵ Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968).

³⁶ Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F. 2d 1251 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 482 U. S. 578 (1987).

³⁷ McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E. D. Ark. 1982) (cited favorably in Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578).

³⁸ See Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 619 F. 2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 987 (1980).

³⁹ See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U. S. 573, 629 (1989) (footnote No. 69, noting the special establishment clause sensitivities present in the public school context); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools, 33 F. 3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994).

⁴⁰ County of Allegheny, 492 U. S. at 616.

⁴¹ Id. at 613-14, 618.

⁴² Id. at 629 (footnote No. 69).

⁴³ Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Florey, 619 F. 2d 1311.

⁴⁴ Schempp, 374 U. S. 203; Sease v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 811 F. Supp. 183 (E. D. Pa. 1993).

⁴⁵ Florey, 619 F. 2d 1311.

⁴⁶ Schempp, 374 U. S. 203.

⁴⁷ Florey, 619 F. 2d 1311.

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ See Koenick v. Felton, 190 F. 3d 259 (4th Cir 1999); Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F. 3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).

⁵⁰ Church of God v. Amarillo Independent School Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613 (N. D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 670 F. 2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982).

⁵¹ Id.

⁵² See Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 42 (1980); ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary County, 354 F.

3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003); Washegesic, 33 F. 3d 679; Joki v. Board of Education of Schuylerville Central School Dist., 745 F. Supp. 823 (N. D. N. Y. 1990).

⁵³ See Stone, 449 U. S. at 42; Baker v. Adams County, 86 Fed. Appx. 104, 2004 WL 68523 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2004).

⁵⁴ See Stone at 42; McCreary County, 354 F. 3d 438.

⁵⁵ See Stone at 41-42; Adams County, 86 Fed. Appx. 104, 2004 WL 68523; McCreary, 354 F. 3d 438.

⁵⁶ See Washegesic, 33 F. 3d 679; Joki, 745 F. Supp. 823.

⁵⁷ A released time program is one in which students are released from school early to attend religious classes off school premises. Participating students must have permission from their parents. Nonparticipating students remain in school.

⁵⁸ Zorach, 343 U. S. 306.

⁵⁹ Regarding school involvement in the administration of a released time program, one court has held that it is unconstitutional for a school to announce the program on school bulletin boards and to distribute cards on which students could express interest in participating in the program. Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, 54 Wash. 2d 886, 344 P. 2d 1036 (1959).

⁶⁰ Illinois ex. rel. McCollum, 333 U. S. 203; Zorach, 343 U. S. 306.

⁶¹ Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F. 3d 274 (4th Cir 1998) (J. Gribbon Motz, concurring in part, dissenting in part).

⁶² See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990).

⁶³ Many state constitutions have establishment clause provisions that are more restrictive than the First Amendment. In some such instances, state law bars all religious meetings on public school grounds and thus comes into direct conflict with the EAA. One appellate court found that, when these conflicts arise, the EAA preempts (overrules) the state law. Garnett v. Renton, 987 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 819 (1993).
⁶⁴Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School. Dist., 85 F. 3d 839 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1040 (1996).

⁶⁵ Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School Board, 336 F. 3d 311 (3rd Cir. 2003); Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees, 106 F. 3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997).

⁶⁶ Hsu, 85 F. 3d at 847-48; Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F. 3d 1244 (3rd Cir 1993).

⁶⁷ 20 U. S. C. A. � 4071( c); Hsu at 857 (footnote 16); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist. 776 F. 2d 431 (3rd Cir 1985).

⁶⁸ Student Coalition for Peace, 776 F. 2d 431.

⁶⁹ See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001). In that case, the U. S. Supreme Court held that an outside religious club could meet at an elementary school after school hours because the school permitted other non-religious groups to meet at the same time and there was no perceived endorsement of the club's religious activity. Although Good News concerned an elementary school, the free speech and religious endorsement principles set forth in the case should be applicable to the middle and secondary school context.

⁷⁰ 2004 WL 1948682 (8th Cir. September 3, 2004).

⁷¹ 533 U. S. at 118.

⁷² Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969).

⁷³ Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F. 3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996).

⁷⁴ Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 342 F. 3d 271 (3rd Cir. 2003); Muller, 98 F. 3d 1530. See Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F. 3d 1267 (11th Cir 2000).
⁷⁵ Muller, 98 F. 3d 1530.

⁷⁶ Hazelwood School Dist., 484 U. S. 260.

⁷⁷ See Peck, 155 F. 3d 274. In that case, the court decided that a secondary school did not vio-late the Establishment Clause by permitting non-school personnel to passively offer religious materials to students on a single day during the school year based on a policy allowing outside non-religious and religious speech in schools. The distribution was passive in that the religious materials were placed on tables within common areas, the non-school personnel were not permitted to stand at the tables during the distribution, and the source of the materials was not identified. Significantly, the court also held that the U. S. Supreme Court would find such a distribution unconstitutional in the elementary school context.

⁷⁸ The Supreme Court recognized a school's interest in protecting against substantial disruption in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U. S. 508 (1969) (public schools may prohibit the wearing of certain symbols or clothing only if the school can show that the restricted item causes a substantial disruption or material interference with school activities).

⁷⁹ See Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Independent School Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E. D. Texas 1993).

⁸⁰ Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law, http:// www.ed.gov/Speeches/04-1995/ prayer.html. See also US Department of Education: Religious Expression in Public Schools, http:// www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html.

⁸¹ Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S. D. TX 1997).

⁸² Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. N. M. 2000).

⁸³ See, e. g., Stephenson v. Davenport Community School Dist., 110 F. 3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977) (tattoo cross on arm not a gang symbol, statute is void for vagueness); City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N. E. 2d 259 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1996) (invalidating city ordinance on overbreadth grounds, because the ordinance outlawing the wearing of "known gang colors, emblems, or other insignia" banned a substantial amount of protected speech, given the fact that "gang colors" and "gang clothing" included the official colors of the local high school, Chicago Bulls jackets, and religious jewelry such as the Star of David).

⁸⁴ See, e. g., Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971).

⁸⁵ Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F. 2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991).

⁸⁶ Lemon, 403 U. S. at 619.

⁸⁷ See, e. g., Marchi v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services of Albany, 173 F. 3d 469 (2nd Cir. 1999); Helland v. South Bend Community School Corp., 93 F. 3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996); Duncanville Independent School Dist., 70 F. 3d 402; Peloza, 37 F. 3d 517.

⁸⁸ See United States v. Board of Education for the School Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F. 2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). See also Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or. 358, 723 P. 2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed, 480 U. S. 942 (1987).

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