In the last several years, Iran has made great strides in its effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence that the election of Mohammad Khatami ­ widely regarded as a political moderate ­ to the Iranian presidency in May 1997 has deterred Iran from its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and Israel have identified Russia as a significant contributor to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The Nuclear Arena

In January 1995, Russia and Iran concluded a nuclear cooperation accord in which Russia agreed to provide Iran with a light-water reactor to be built at Iran's Gulf port of Bushehr, low-enriched uranium fuel, and training for personnel to operate the reactor. Construction of the 1,000-megawatt, $850 million Bushehr reactor has begun and is expected to be completed by the year 2000.

While Iran insists that the nuclear reactor is intended for civilian nuclear power purposes only, nuclear experts and Administration officials point out that reactor grade plutonium can be used to create a nuclear bomb. Other concerns are that Teheran could divert the Bushehr technology for a nuclear weapons program, use the experience gained at Bushehr to initiate a clandestine weapons program or could use Bushehr to draw attention away from a clandestine effort located elsewhere. For these reasons, Washington has pressed Moscow to cease work on the reactor despite the fact that the deal is legal under international rules.

While American pressure has been unsuccessful in stopping the Bushehr project, U.S. intervention did lead Russia to suspend other parts of the 1995 nuclear cooperation agreement including Iranian purchase of another light water research reactor and a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. Moscow has also stipulated that spent fuel from the Bushehr power plant be returned to Russia. More recently, however, Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry has announced plans to build two more nuclear reactors at Bushehr.

In addition to concerns over the reactors, American officials are worried about Iran's ongoing efforts to acquire technology from the Russians to enrich uranium and separate plutonium from spent fuel. U.S. intelligence has recently documented a series of high-level technical exchanges between Russian and Iranian engineers and technicians related to nuclear cooperation and believes that Russian experts may still be advising Iran on its effort to mine uranium ore and process it for eventual use in a nuclear program.

The Missile Arena

It is believed that Russia began working on Iran's long-range missile projects in 1994 by providing materials, technology, expert manpower and training. Moscow is currently thought to be the main supplier of Iran's efforts to develop longer-range missiles. Analysts speculate that with continued Russian help, Teheran will have the ability to launch ballistic missiles equipped with chemical, biological and other warheads capable of reaching Israel and other states in the region within the next 18 months.

Based on North Korean missile design technology, Russia is reportedly helping Iran build the Shahab-3 missile by providing materials, equipment and technical assistance. The Shahab-3 has a range of about 800 miles ­ long enough to reach Israel and Saudi Arabia and more than twice the range of a Scud missile. American intelligence has observed several engine tests for the Shahab-3 and it is believed that development will be completed in early 1999.

Moscow is also helping Teheran build a more powerful missile, the Shahab-4, based on Russia's SS-4 strategic rockets. The Shahab-4 flies faster to elude defense and could reach Europe with its 1,200-mile range. It is said to be within three years of development.

According to Iran observer Kenneth Timmerman, the Russians are also helping a solid-fuel design team in Teheran develop a 2,800-mile missile, capable of reaching London and Paris and a 6,300-mile missile that could strike cities in the eastern United States.

American and other Western intelligence sources have confirmed that several hundred Russian engineers and technicians travel regularly to missile facilities outside Teheran and when Iranians have problems, they fly to military institutes in Russia to see how the Russians solve similar issues.

For some time, Congress has been pressing both Moscow and the U.S. Administration to take concrete actions to stop governmental and nongovernmental entities in Russia from providing missile technology and technical advice to Iran. In October 1997, Congress introduced the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 imposing sanctions on foreign entities charged with transferring or attempting to transfer goods, technology, or technical assistance that contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles. The sanctions would bar arms exports, dual-use goods or technology and U.S. Government assistance in any form. At this writing, the bill has passed the House and is awaiting passage by the Senate.

For its part, Moscow has repeatedly denied helping Iran with its missile program. It has acknowledged that Iran has tried to obtain missile technology from Russian companies, but insists that all such Iranian attempts have been thwarted.

A Senate subcommittee report in January 1998 refutes Moscow's claims. It alleges that Moscow's Polyus Research Institute has supplied advanced guidance systems to Iran and that Russia's Central Aero-hydrodynamic Institute has contracts to help Iran build wind tunnels and provide missile-design software. Furthermore, the report states, Iranian students are studying rocket construction at schools such as the Baltic State University in St. Petersburg.

More recently, Russian officials have admitted some sales by privately owned companies but still deny government complicity. In response to vigorous American prodding, Moscow has taken several small steps to curtail such activity. It suspended a contract that Russian rocket engine manufacturer NPO Trud had with Iran to develop an engine for the Shahab-3 and expelled an Iranian diplomat who was trying to purchase missile technology. In an institutionalized response in early 1998, Russia issued a decree prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items that could be used for developing weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems.

American officials, however, worry that the decree is unenforceable and will not be observed by the Russian bureaucracy or by Russian missile institutes and scientific centers. A Russian analyst recently commented, "You can have better regulations, but a person in the Customs Service still has no incentive to check." Indeed, American intelligence officials have reported that Russian intelligence and security services are continuing to cooperate with missile technology exchanges with Iran.

The U.S. continues to raise the issue with senior Russian officials. In March 1998, Vice President Al Gore held talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Washington about Russian missile technology transfers to Iran. Most recently, Washington has sought to dissuade Moscow from assisting in Iran's missile development program by quietly offering Russia an opportunity to expand its business in launching foreign satellites. If Russia clamps down, the U.S. will ease its limits on Russian launchers.

This article was written just as Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was dismissed from office. The current political fluidity in Russia makes this matter even more uncertain.

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