Two germ warfare scares on American shores -- a suspicious package thought to contain biological agents mailed to B'nai B'rith national headquarters in Washington, DC, in April 1997 and the seizure of anthrax from a white supremacist near Las Vegas in February 1998 -- have heightened concern about the domestic threat of biological terrorism.

Silent Killers

Biological weapons are silent and invisible killers. Inexpensive, easy to produce and to conceal, biological agents have the potential to inflict mass casualties. On the other hand, their effects are delayed and unpredictable, they are sensitive to environmental conditions and difficult to disperse. Although experts cite the low probability of a biological weapons attack, they note the extremely catastrophic consequences of such an assault.

Several factors have raised the general specter of the bio-terrorist threat. First, as the fields of biological research and biotechnology have grown, access to biological agents, technology and methods of production has become easier and greater. In addition, biological toxins are thousands of times more lethal than the most lethal chemical warfare agents. Second, the goals of terrorists have changed. Rather than seeking legitimacy and a seat at the negotiating table, the terrorists of today seek to strike a blow in anger and kill as many people as possible. Third, the means of delivery of biological weapons -- aerosol sprays, bombs and missile warheads -- have become far more effective.

Unconventional Terrorism

Finally, the taboo against unconventional terrorism was broken with the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo's March 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway that killed 12 people and injured 5,000. Recently released information indicates that the cult had also worked hard to produce biological weapons and had attempted at least four separate bioterrorist strikes before its nerve gas attack. Tokyo, New York and Washington were the planned targets.

Also in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had built and hidden a large biological arsenal and was prepared to use it during the Gulf War in 1991. United Nations weapons inspectors recently uncovered evidence that Iraq put deadly VX nerve gas into missile warheads before the Gulf War.

Use of Biological Agents in the U.S

Unauthorized use of biological agents in the U.S. has thus far been limited to a few isolated cases. The only known case of an actual germ attack in the United States was in 1984 when an American religious cult sprayed salmonella on 10 salad bars in Oregon in an effort to make voters sick and influence a county election. Within two weeks, 751 people became violently ill.

In May 1995, white supremacist and microbiologist Larry Harris ordered samples of the organism that causes bubonic plague from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a clearinghouse for microbiological samples. (There are 453 such repositories worldwide.) Mr. Harris was prosecuted for mail fraud because it is not illegal to possess biological agents in the U.S. Since the Harris case, shippers and receivers of certain biological agents have been required to register with the Centers for Disease Control.

Also in 1995, members of the far-right Minnesota Patriots Council were found guilty of producing the toxic agent ricin in a 1992 plot to assassinate Federal officials. Militia members reportedly manufactured enough ricin from a book recipe to kill 125 people. Detailed techniques for extracting ricin from castor beans are widely available.

Since the Persian Gulf War, the Department of Defense has stepped up its military preparedness to confront the threat of biological terrorism. For some time, however, military and scientific experts have been alarmed at the nation's limited ability to respond to the threat of biological terrorism in the civilian sector.

The Bio-Terrorist Threat: Congressional Hearings

Over the course of the last few months, Congress has held several hearings examining the bio-terrorist threat. At these hearings, senior government officials have outlined steps the Administration is taking to confront the threat.

Also at the hearings, State and local officials have criticized the Federal Government for concentrating government spending in this area on the Pentagon, rather than on the local level. For example, in March 1998, the Department of Defense announced plans to allocate $50 million to create biological response units in the National Guards of the nation's 10 most populous states. State and local officials have complained that this money would be better put to use in the hands of "first responders" -- local police, fire and health officials who would arrive at the scene of an attack before Federal or state resources would be deployed.

Federal officials have only recently acknowledged publicly that the country's top emergency, medical and investigative agencies are not equipped to handle terror attacks with advanced biological weapons. A major interagency study, a draft of which was recently obtained by The Washington Post, found widespread deficiencies in the Federal Government's ability to combat terrorism in general, including germ warfare. One of the major obstacles cited was the lack of information sharing among different government agencies.

Slow Paced Implementation

Another problem is the slow pace at which enacted legislation is implemented. In 1996, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Pete Domenici (R-NM). The act directed the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other Federal agencies, to spend $160 million to train personnel in the 120 largest American cities to respond to biological terrorism. At this writing, emergency response personnel in only 27 cities had completed the mandated training.

Alarms were sounded after a March 1998 practice exercise, in which 40 Federal military, health, police and emergency officials reacted to terrorists spreading genetically engineered smallpox along America's southern border. The agencies involved were quickly overwhelmed and unprepared to deal with the demand for resources and the public panic that would be generated.

Presidential Action

President Clinton responded swiftly to these findings, calling biological terrorism a "21st century threat" to American national security. He directed various U.S. agencies to focus on the danger and to initiate a wide array of programs aimed at bolstering domestic preparedness for this horrific threat.

In a major policy address before the U.S. Naval Academy in May, President Clinton spoke of measures to guard against biological terrorism. He outlined three initiatives: a stepped-up campaign against terrorism; an effort to detect vulnerabilities in the nation's computer networks and defend against attacks, and a plan to protect civilians against biological attacks by training local officials, stockpiling vaccines and conducting research into new medicines and diagnostic tools. The President spoke of plans to create a stockpile of vaccines and antibiotics that would be available in case of an attack. He also called for steps to improve preparedness of public-health agencies, to create an infrastructure for the quick manufacture of treatment drugs, and to streamline government processes for detecting and managing a biological crisis.

Also in May, the President signed Presidential Directive 62 -- the Combating Terrorism Directive -- which highlights the growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United States. It establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism which will oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs including counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction.

In June, the President asked Congress to provide an additional $294 million to deter and respond to terrorist incidents involving the use of biological or chemical weapons. The funding would provide equipment and specialized training for state and local health and rescue workers, improve the current surveillance system to detect biological or chemical agents, and build a civilian stockpile of antidotes and antibiotics. Under last-minute additions to the Federal budget at the end of June, $200 million was added to the Justice Department's 1999 budget for these purposes.

Local Actions

On the local level, New York City launched an ambitious anti-germ warfare program two years ago, buying germ detectors, working out deals with regional hospitals for emergency care and with drug companies to make medicines quickly in an emergency and taking steps to stockpile medications. Since September 1997, the city has undergone an extensive training program, instructing 4,000 city police officers and firefighters in how to handle a germ emergency.

Problem for the Government: Will Education Create Fear?

Ultimately, the government is caught in a bind regarding educating the public about the biological terrorism threat. No one wants to panic the American public unnecessarily and there are no all-encompassing solutions to the threat. Furthermore, highlighting the threat could increase its appeal to terrorists. On the other hand, educating the public and increasing public preparedness will surely save lives in the event of such an attack.

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